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INTRODUCTION

"Politics" is a dirty word in Michigan.

Being involved in

politics in the Auto State places a person on approximately the same
level as the operator of a numbers racket, a bistro, or perhaps one
of Detroitfs higher-class burlesque houses.

To the average citizen

of Michigan, a politician is a denizen of a hazy other-world who steps
out of his natural habitat of shyster lawyers, rackets, bosses, gangster hideouts, secret passage ways, and corrupt labor union officials
to buy enough votes to keep him in his lucrative position until the
next election.
Into this scene steps George Romney, riding the White Charger
of Virtue, and armed only with Honesty, Faith In The People, Belief In
God, and Morality. Are these outdated, medieval-style weapons capable
of subduing and overcoming the modern, well-used and highly effective
armaments of Corruption, Graft, Lethargy, and Intrenched Machine Politics?

This, figuratively speaking, is the central question posed by

the Michigan gubernatorial election of 1962.
The author had the opportunity to observe first hand the various elements of this fascinating drama as they unfolded in the most
unusual political career of this most unusual man. What follows is
an effort to tell this story.

An important part of the Romney story has its roots in the

1

2
political conditions of the state itself.

The 110-member House of

Representatives is apportioned on a straight population basis with the
provision that any county or group of counties is entitled to a representative if its population is equal to one-half of the current ratio
of representation.

The legislature is reapportioned to meet popula-

tion changes every ten

2
years.

This gives the rural areas of lower

population a proportionally greater representation than the more densely
populated urban areas.

As the Democratic party tends to draw its

major strength from the urban areas, and the Republican party draws its
supporters from the more rural areas, the apportionment provisions have
tended to favor the Republican party.

The Republicans have, therefore,

tended to dominate the House of Representatives.

In 1958, the Republi-

cans lost their majority in the House for the first time since 1938,
and then only by a 55-55 tie.

Many of the Republican Representatives

have been elected time after time to the House and because of their
long incumbency, have failed to keep up with the political thinking
of the more urban segment of the party.

These "Old Guard" Republicans

have continued to wield considerable influence in the legislature and
have often proved more of an obstacle to the other segment of the party
in legislative matters than the Democratic legislators.

1

Many of these conditions have changed with the adoption of
the new constitution. These will be treated in some detail in a later
chapter. However, as the Romney election took place under the old
constitution, treatment of it is pertinent to our discussion here.
2

Citizens Research Council of Michigan, Michigan Constitutional Issues (Detroit: Citizens Research Council, 1960), Report No.
201, p. 14.
3

John P. White, Michigan Votes (Ann Arbor; Institute of Public
Administration, University of Michigan, 1958 Supplement).

3
The constitution provides for a Senate of 34 members and defines the 25 senatorial districts outside of Wayne and Kent counties.
Two Senators are allotted to Kent county and seven to Wayne.4 The
senatorial districts are set by the constitution*

The apportionment

is also heavily favorable to the rural-Republican areas of the state.
The same problem of the "Old Guard" that exists in the House also
exists in the Senate.
Opposition to change from the legislature has become a by-word
in Michigan politics.

Part of the problem can be seen in the fact that

three of Michigan's counties, Wayne, Macomb, and Oakland, have 48 per
cent of the state's population but only 26 per cent of the Senate seats
and only 43 per cent of the House seats.

An increase in political power

for these counties would obviously be at the expense of the other
eighty counties, which now have the other 52 per cent of the state's
population, 74 per cent of the Senate seats and 57 per cent of the House
seats.

The potential conflict inherent in this situation is obvious.
Michigan has the "weak executive" form of government, wherein

the people elect, in addition to the governor, seven other members
of the executive branch.

These seven officials comprise what is

called the "Administrative Council." These officers ares

Lieutenant

Governor, Secretary of State, State Treasurer, Auditor General, Attorney
General, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Highway Commissioner,,1
Michigan is the only state in the Union that elects its Highway

4

Citizens Research Council, op, cit., p. 15.

5

Ibid., p. ii.

6

Under the new constitution this number is reduced to four:
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, and Attorney
General.

4
Commissioner.7

The entire Administrative Council, including the Gove-

nor, is elected for two-year terms.
As administrative agencies have grown, the appointive power
has grown haphazardly with them.

As a result, no specific method of

appointment exists, but rather a system of conflicting methods,

Some

appointments are made by the governor, others by special boards, some
by members of the Administrative Council, and still others by the legislature.

There are some 120 separate state administrative agencies.

Many are headed by boards and commissions only indirectly responsible
to the governor.

Numerous jurisdictional conflicts result from this

system.
The last Republican governor before Governor Romney was Kim
Segler who served from 1947-1949.

From 1949 to 1963, a period of 14

years, there was a Democrat in Lansing who was continually in conflict
with the always-Republican legislature.

During this time, there were

only two governors, G. Mennen (Soapy) Williams, now Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs in the Kennedy-Johnson administration,
who served as governor from 1949 to 1960, and John B. Swainson, a Purple
Heart veteran of World War II (in which he lost both legs) who served
from 1961 to 1963.
At issue during this 14-year Democratic sojourn in the governor's chair have been charges by the Republicans of ever-increasing
labor union domination and control of Democratic public officials and
party goals and policies.

The Democrats deny this and point to the

support of the "common man" whom they represent rather than the

^Citizens Research Council, op. cit. , pp. 3, 4. Mississippi
elects a three-man commission for highways, but Michigan is the only
one that elects a single commissioner.

5
support of "vested interests" and "big business" which they feel the
Republican party represents.

This all adds up to a stormy political

climate, many conflicts, charges and counter-charges, and many, many
problems.
The average citizen of Michigan feels that a person has to be
corrupt to fit into the political system and that if he is not corrupt
when he decides to go into politics, he will have to become corrupt to
get elected and to stay in office. A typical expression encountered by
the author in interviewing hundreds of people during the Romney campaign was: "Why does a good clean guy like Romney want to get into a
dirty racket like politics?"

Perhaps an even more significant question

would be "What will a good clean guy like Romney do in politics?"
thesis is an attempt to answer these questions.

This

CHAPTER ONE

"THIS ROMNEY GUY - WHAT'S HE REALLY LIKE?" 1

This question is significant.

What compels a man who has

reached the pinnacle of success in the business world, who is financially secure and who carries an impeccable reputation with him into
the highest social and religious areas of our society, to risk losing
all this in the rough and tumble world of politics?

Perhaps a brief

sketch of the life of this man will provide some clues.
George Romney was born in the Mormon colonies in Mexico July 8,
1907, the fourth of seven children born to Gaskell and Anna Amelia
Pratt Romney.

When George was five, the revolution forced his family

out of Mexico.

After living in such places as El Paso, Texas; Los

Angeles, California; and Oakley and Rexburg, Idaho, his family settled
in Salt Lake City in 1921.

While in Rexburg, George graduated from
3

grammar school as valedictorian.

In Salt Lake City, George's father

became a well known contractor, and George demonstrated considerable
skill as a carpenter.
While living in Salt Lake City, George attended Roosevelt
Junior High School, then the old Latter-day Saints University high
school and junior college.

As he was from a family of athletes,

question asked almost daily of the Romney staff members
during the campaign.
2

Tom Mahoney, The Story of George Romney (New York: Harper &
Bros,, 1960), p. 53.
3

Ibid. , p. 67.

6

7
George attempted to uphold the tradition.

He played on various base-

ball, football, and basketball teams during his high school and
college days.

While known for his indomitable spirit and fair ability,

he never managed to match some of his athletically superior relatives.4
During his senior year, George, then seventeen, met Lenore
LaFount, a fifteen-year old brunette who was a high school junior.
This was an important event for George as Lenore was to play an
increasingly significant role in his life.
The next year, George was elected president of the student
body at Latter-day Saints University.

Some of George's classmates

at LDSU were Frank E. Moss, currently U . S . Senator from Utah; Meridith
Wilson, presently president of the University of Minnesota; and Richard
L. Evans, who is now an apostle of the Mormon Church.
On October 22, 1926, George left for a mission to Great Britain.
During his two years in the British Isles, which was spent mostly in
London and Scotland, he served under both James E. Talmage and John Ac
Widtsoe as mission presidents.

He held several positions, including

that of District Clerk and District President, and was known by all
as a dynamic, friendly, and exceptionally successful missionary.
Returning to the United States in 1928, George studied at the
University of Utah for part of a year, and then went to Washington,
D. C. where he enrolled at George Washington University.

Taking night

classes, he answered a want ad and obtained a job as a stenographer
4

Ibid., pp. 68, 69.

3

Ibid., p. 72.

6

Marya Saunders and Bob Gaines, "The Missionary Side of George
Romney," Family Weekly (March 3, 1963), p. 5. Mahoney, op. cit., p. 74.
^Mahoney, op. cit. , pp. 75-88.

s
on the staff of Senator David I. Walsh, the first Democrat sent by
8

Massachusetts to the Senate since the Civil War.
Not always adequate as a stenographer, George soon was doing
research for Senator Walsh.

He did all of the Senator's research during

the debates on the Hawley-Smoot tariff bill and sat with him as he
o
delivered speeches on the floor of the Senate.

His numerous activi-

ties in this position gave him invaluable experience in government.
During the course of his work on the tariff research, George
had come in contact with several top executives of the Aluminum Company
of America,,

In 1930, they offered him a job which he accepted.10

During his apprenticeship, he requested and was assigned to
the Alcoa office in Los Angeles, where Lenore LaFount, his high school
sweetheart, was working as an actress.

He persuaded her to give up her

career, and on July 2, 1931, there were married in the Salt Lake Temple.11
He later said this was the "best selling job I ever did."
His apprenticeship over, the newly married couple moved back
to Washington, D. C. where George worked as lobbyist for Alcoa until
12
1939,
During this time, he rose from a salary of $250.00 per month
to something over $10,000 per year.

13

Irritated when he did not receive a promotion he felt he deserved, Romney accepted a position he was offered by the Automobile
Manufacturers Association to head their new office in Detroit, which
8

Ibid., p. 91.

9

Saunders, op. cit., p. 5.

10

Mahoney,

11

Ibid.,

Mahoney, op. cit., pp. 91-94.

op. cit., p. 96.

p. 98.

l2

Newsweek, February 19, 1962, p. 25.

13

Mahoney, op. cit., pp. 99, 109.

9
position he assumed in January of

1940.14

The AMA soon became involved

in the war effort in support of the Allied powers, and shortly after
Pearl Harbor, Romney was named managing director of the Automotive
Council for War Production.

On March 4, 1942, he was also made general

15
manager of the AMA.
By 1948, Romney was well known in the world of industry.

He

was offered several positions by various leading companies, but he
16
finally decided to go to Nash-Kelvinator in April of 1948.
He chose
this job at thirty thousand a year over a similar offer from Packard
at fifty thousand a year because he felt the Nash-Kelvinator position
offered him a brighter future.

At Nash Kelvinator, Romney soon made

a name for himself as a fighter and a man with good ideas.
of 1953, he was named executive vice-president of the

In January

company.17

He was instrumental in effecting the merger of Nash-Kelvinator
with Hudson Motor Car Company to form the new American Motors Corporation.

The merger was finalized on May 1,

1954.18

upon the death of

George Mason, Romney took over as president, general manager, and chairman of the board of American Motors on October 12,

1954.19

Since this

time, American Motors has, under his leadership, moved from a position
of bankruptcy to a position of serious competition with the Big Three.
Many observers credit Romney with having "saved" the industry with
his leadership of the "compact car revolution" which created American
14

p. 109.

15

p. 115.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

16

Newsweek,

17

loc. cite

Mahoney, op. cit., pp. 132-141.

Mahoney, op. cit., p. 165.

18

p. 172.

19

p. 184.

Ibid.,

lbid.,

10
competition to the ever increasing amount of foreign cars imported into
the U . S . each year.

This tide has been stemmed considerably by the

current American competition in this field.

20

In December of 1956, Romney was asked by the Detroit Board of
Eudcation to be chairman of a Citizens' Advisory Committee to advise
on school needs and to help solve the steadily worsening problems of
Detroit public

schools.

Although this was probably his busiest and

most challenging period at American Motors, Romney accepted and subsequently exercised a great influence in the making of drastic and important changes in the school structure and especially in the procurement and more efficient use of funds.
In May of 1959, a

month

21

after the now famous22 "Payless Pay

Day" in Michigan at which time the State was unable to meet its payroll,
Romney and other prominent leaders of the state met together and formed
"Citizens for Michigan," a non-partisan

group which suggested many

reforms, such as a modernized tax structure, and a proposal which
eventually led to the calling of a constitutional convention.

23

was formally elected chairman of the group in September of 1959.

Romney
He

served in this capacity until the beginning of his gubernatorial campaign

20

George Romney did not originate the "compact car revolution,,"
It had long been a dream of George Mason, Romneyfs predecessor as
president of American Motors, to build a small car to fill the needs
of the American public. The Nash Metropolitian is an example of
MasonVs effort to fill this need. Most people in the automobile
industry credit Romney with the business and promotional know-how
to sell this idea to the public. As an example of his influence, the
term "compact," now standard throughout the industry, is Romney's own
term, coined in the process of selling "compact" Ramblers.
21

Newsweek, February 19, 1962, p. 25.

22

" o r notorious.

23

Newsweek, February 19, 1962, p. 26.

11
in February of 1962. 2 4
In 1961, Romney was elected as a delegate from Oakland county
to the Constitutional Convention, which met in Lansing from October 3,

1961, to May 11,

1962.25

During this period Romney served as vice-

president of the Convention and commuted almost daily from his home
in the Detroit suburb of Bloomfield Hills to Lansing,

a distance of

eighty miles, and prorated his salary for time off from work*
On February 10, 1962, George Romney, after a 24-hour period
of fasting and prayer, announced he would be a candidate for the governorship of Michigan,

On February 12, 1962, he resigned as president and

chairman of the board of American Motors, but remained as a director
and vice-chairman of the board.

Upon his election to the governorship

in November 1962, he severed all ties with the company.
Although not a college graduate, Romney has received honorary
degrees from Wayne State University (1959), Brigham Young University
(1959), University of Utah (1960), Michigan State University (1961),
George Washington University (1961), MaCalester College (1961), Albion
College (1962), Detroit Institute of Technology (1962), and Arizona
State University (1962).

In addition to these degrees, he has received

numerous civic, industrial, and public service awards.
Faithfully devoted to his religion, George Romney believes a
basic foundation in religion to be a necessity in forming the philosophy
and value system of every person.

In 1944, he was made Branch President

24

Mahoney, op. cit., p. 244.

25

Michigan Challenge, June 1962, p. 5.

26

During the return trip from Lansing (usually late at night),
Romney would don pajamas and utilize the fold-back seat in his
chauffeur-driven Rambler to get a good hour of sleep*

12
of the Detroit Branch of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints and since that time has served in various positions of religious
leadership in the Mormon Church as well as other religious organizations, notably the Detroit Round Table of Christians and Jews. Since
its inception, Romney served as President of the Detroit Stake of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, resigning only after he
was elected governor of Michigan,
This brings us to the present. What is he like today?
did he present himself to the voters of Michigan?
and what makes him do the things he does?

How

How does he think,

Some personal glimpses might

help:
George Romney, prophet of the compact car, Mormon Church
leader and Republican candidate for Governor of Michigan, is a
most unusual politician. He is more than that. He is about
as remarkable a political phenomenon as has appeared on the
American scene in a couple of decades27
George Romney is perhaps the most interesting and important
figure to emerge on the Detroit scene in a quarter of a
century,28
These comments are typical of hundreds made about George Romney.
Why do so many people who meet him comment on the "aura of greatness"
he seems to have about him?

What are some of the factors that have

caused him to receive such favorable public reaction?
Fifty-five years old, 5 feet 11 inches tall, 175 pounds, trim
rugged looking, he is an impressive figure with his graying hair, which
is

a

rich

"gun-metal"

color on top, shading to a "frosty white

27

Stewart Alsop, "George Romney: The GOP's Fast Comer," The
Saturday Evening Post, May 26, 1962, p. 15,
28
Mahoney, op, cit,, p. vii (This was written in 1960, before
it was known Romney would run for the governorship of Michigan).

13
at the temples."

29

His ready and winning smile; his warm, powerful

handshake, his habit of grasping the shoulder of the person with whom
he is shaking hands and the aura of ebullient energy he seems to carry
with him wherever he goes, all seem to make him almost an ideal
political candidate.
Perhaps the most striking thing with which one is impressed
upon meeting George Romney is his boundless energy,,
be in a hurry.

He seems always to

One reporter described him as follows;

Romney, whose normal walking gait approaches that of a practiced quarter-miler, strode through his pre-arranged tour, shaking
hands and chatting with everyone in sight. Campaign aides tried
their best to keep ahead of the oncoming candidate to distribute
literature, but often found themselves panting along in his wake.
He is almost disarming when meeting people.
best.

Here he is at his

During the campaign, he would descend upon a store, cafe, fire

station, or any other place where he knew he would find a few people,
announce that he was George Romney, and would begin shaking hands.
His usual approach while shaking hands was something like, "Hi, I'm
George Romney--I need your vote on election day," or, "I feel I can do
a good job for you."

Whenever his schedule left him a few minutes

without anything to do, he could be found somewhere shaking hands and
chatting with prospective voters.
Anytime anyone would ask him a question, he would stop immediately
and answer it to the best of his ability.

If his questioner were of an

opposite political persuasion and wanted to argue, Romney was always
ready, grasping the person's shoulder and shaking it occasionally to

29

30

Newsweek, February 19, 1962, p. 23.

St. Johns, Clinton County (Michigan) Republican-News, August
3, 1962, p. 2 (The author can testify to this, as he worked as a Romney
aide on many occasions).

14
emphasize a point, or poking his finger into the chest of his questioner to make sure he had his undivided attention.

It was always dif-

ficult to escape the impression that Romney, though

not always smoothly

articulate, had ended up on top of the argument.
Occasionally, however, his sense of right would be offended,
for example, when someone would refuse to shake hands with him.

When

this would occur, Romney would roar, "See what I mean about partisanship?
with

This man won't even shake hands with me!
Michigan!"31

This is what's wrong

Once, during a visit to the offices of the Detroit

Free Press for a group interview, Romney accused a reporter of prejudice
against him.

This was more than the managing editor, himself a Romney

admirer, could take.
lie, George!"

He jumped to his feet and yelled, "That's a
32
Retorted Romney, "The hell it is!"

More than

once during the campaign his temper caused him serious trouble. However, as a general rule, he was able to hold his composure quite well.
For example, when Romney and August Scholle, Michigan's AFL-CIO boss,
debated the question of apportionment, Mr. Scholle became livid with
rage while Romney, unperturbed, suggested, "Calm down, Gus."

33

During

some of the TV debates, and other times when Romney was exposed to some
rather pointed and many times calculated questions, those who worked
closely with him and knew him would shudder as they would see his face
begin to color.

However, his anger usually appeared to take the form

of righteous indignation, and the people listening generally felt he
had a right to be angry.

During questioning by union officials on a

31

Time, November 16, 1962, p. 21.

32

Ibid., p. 22.

33

Newsweek, February 19, 1962, p. 24.

15
number of occasions, Romney would explode, "You don't want to hear my
answers--I know your type—• you know all the questions, but are not
open-minded enough to hear my answers!ft
Romney's close friends, who served as his advisors during the
campaign, and those of his staff who participated in the decision-making
sessions, soon found out about his iron will--sometimes they would
persuade him on a point, but generally he would say,

ff

We can't afford

to tie ourselves to traditional methods--this is the way we are going
to do it.n

All who worked with him agreed, it was Romney and no one

else who was running the campaign.

He seemed to have the facility to

let all the small details stay in the hands of his staff, yet to have
his finger on all the major decisions.
Romney generated a tremendous amount of respect from his staff
and those who worked closely with him. His staff members never referred to
him as other than "Mr. Romney" or some similar title showing their respect.
His drivers and others of the staff who traveled with him, although
most smoked, would not smoke in his presence, out of deference for his
beliefs, as he had not asked them to refrain from smoking.
Many people remarked that he seemed to have a flair for the
unorthodox and unusual, yet that he had the ability to make it all seem
right and logical and just the thing to do.

For instance, few political

candidates have made a roaring success of door-to-door campaigning.
Yet, one of the most successful and interesting afternoons of the author's
experience with Romney was spent going door to door, calling on voters
and asking them to come to a meeting to be held later on in the evening
at a neighborhood high school.

Romney went from one door to the next,

campaign aides, reporters, photographers, and children following him.
He would knock, introduce himself, ask them for their vote, answer any

16
questions they might have and invite them to the meeting to be held
that

evening.

The meeting was crowded to

overflowing.34

One of George's close associates remarked, "The more you see of
35
George Romney, the more you realize his religion is the key to the man,"
Skeptical at first, the author came to believe this to be exactly true*
His political philosophy is obviously grounded in the teachings of the
Prophet Joseph Smith and LDS theology as is plainly evident by a study
of his speeches and remarks. An example of this is found in the belief
that he holds and often expresses, that the Constitution of the United
States is inspired of

God936

and that America is a land chosen of God

as a "land which is choice above all other l a n d s "

37

His belief in the

fundamental worth of the individual as God f s greatest creation, which
belief supplied the theoretical basis of Citizens for Michigan and much
of his political platform, can also be traced to his Mormon religion,,
Phrases and ideas involving these tenets will invariably crop up in a
political discussion with George Romney. Behind all these ideas lies a
simple fundamental faith in God, to which his philosophical tenets can
be traced.
Romney has the ability to get to the root of a matter and to
discover, at least to his own satisfaction, "What is wrong," or, "What
the trouble is."

This he does occasionally at the expense of bypassing

34

During a brief lunch break, in which Romney consumed two
sandwiches and a glass of milk in about 35 seconds, he remarked to the
author, "Just like the mission field all over again, isn't it?"
35

Alsop, op. cit., p. 16.

36

D o c t r i n e & Covenants ( S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah:
C h r i s t of L a t t e r - d a y S a i n t s , 1955), Sec. 1 0 1 : 7 7 , 80.
37

The Book of Mormon ( S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah:
C h r i s t of L a t t e r - d a y S a i n t s , 1955), 1 Nephi, 2:20.

Church of J e s u s
Church of J e s u s

17
some of the complicating factors in a situation,,
him well as a political candidate.
failed to grasp what he was talking
forthright, to the

point.

This ability served

Few who listened to his speeches
about.

His statements are blunt,

In fact, he finds it almost impossible to

answer a question or make a comment without candidly saying exactly
what he

thinks.36

A comment typical of Romney's political philosophy:

"The political parties are not run by the citizens any more, they are
run by the special interest,groups, and that's wrong."
veloped a very low status in our society.
politics has been on the low side."

"Politics has de-

The ethics of people in

His cures

"citizen participation"

in government and a greatly increased "citizen awareness" of governmental processes.

These ideas provided the theoretical basis for the

"Citizens for Michigan Committee" whose actions led directly to the
calling of a constitutional convention as well as many other needed
Michigan reforms.

39

Romney feels that any large aggregation of power is dangerous
to our fundamental governmental system.

For this reason, he has advo-

cated the break-up of such large corporations as General Motors,

and

has recommended the cessation of industry-wide bargaining in favor
of bargaining on the individual company level.
wide strikes are not only harmful but unnecessary.

He feels industryIt is not meant here

to convey the idea that, because many of these ideas are relatively
39

A possible exception to this could be the method with which
he has handled interviewers' questions about the presidential issue. Here,
on occasion, he has managed to sound somewhat like a politician.
sop, op. cit., p. 18.
40

In spite of this fact, many General Motors executives worked
diligently for his election.
41

Selig S. Harrison, "Romney and the Republicans," The New
Republic, March 5, 1962, p. 21.

18
simple and uncomplicated, they are not valid, but merely to point out
Romney's facility to get to the basics of a situation and to start from
there to solve the problems.
Another Romney trait, his personal physical fitness program,
can be traced directly to his LDS

background.

He believes the "body

is the temple of the spirit" and that it is our responsibility to
maintain our bodies as fit "temples" in which our spirits may dwell.
As with everything else, he attacks this aspect of his life with vigor
and purposefulness.

His early morning "compact golf" games (3 balls

for 6 holes) in the summer and his early morning runs through the snow
in the winter are almost legend in the Detroit suburb of Bloomfield
Hills where he lives.

One key to his boundless energy is his ability

to rejuvinate himself with short naps during the day--a daily necessity on his campaign schedule.

These naps, from 20 mintues to an hour,

seemed to be all he needed to keep up his brisk pace throughout campaign days beginning anywhere from 3:30 to 6 a.m. and lasting generally
until 11 or 12 p.m.
An active family man, George could always find time to devote to
his wife and four children.

This wholesome family image, which included

taking each Sunday off during the campaign to attend church with his
family, proved to be a great asset to Romney's candidacy.
Especially of value to the campaign was Romney's wife, Lenore.
When George first announced his intention to run for governor, Mrs.
Romney said that she felt her greatest contribution to the campaign
would probably be by "keeping things serene at home."

42

However, after

Romney once remarked to the author, "No man can do a good
day's work if he is not in good physical shape . . . all desk workers
need supplementary exercise to maintain peak efficiency."
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the success of several public appearances she made early in the campaign,
this approach was vetoed by Romney staff officials.
Early in the campaign the strategy adopted was to have Mrs.
Romney "fill in the spaces" where George's coverage of the state was
weak.

In other words, Mrs. Romney's schedule undertook the project of

supporting and sustaining the initial Romney campaign effort.

In addi-

tion to this, she was nearly always available to fill in at the last
minute when her husband was unable to fulfill some speaking assignment.
Mrs. Romney spent almost five months on the campaign trail,
during which time she was accompanied by Mrs. Elly Peterson, the state
GOP vice chairman and field services director.

43

Her political tour,

dubbed the "Hello Mrs. Romney" project, consisted of speaking at public
rallies and luncheon meetings in all of the state's 83 counties.

As

did her husbnad, she traveled both by car and airplane.
Her political image seemed to have that magic combination of
style, sincerity, and enthusiasm that caused even the opposition to comment on her apparent "sincerity" and "goodness."

One newspaper com-

mented that her success as a speaker was due to her "artlessness."

44

According to Mrs. Romney, who admits that she is nervous before a speaking engagement, she just stands up and says "what's on my mind and in my
heart." 45

In almost all cases, she spoke without notes.

is rapid, articulate, and extremely enthusiastic.

Her delivery

Her speeches generally

reflect the current issues of the campaign, and her phrases and ideas
in many cases are the same as those found in her husband's speeches.

43

The Detroit News, July 29, 1962, p. 3-A.
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Ibid., June 15, 1962, p. 3-A.

45

Ibid.
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She seems, however, to have the knack of simplifying these ideas and
bringing them to the level where they can be understood by her predominately female audiences.

One woman commented, "during these

political things my attention usually wanders, but not this time.
hand.46

had the whole audience in the palm of her

She

Others expressed

the idea that listening to Mrs. Romney was just like talking to a good
friend about deeply held beliefs.
Mrs. Romney seems to have the knack of bringing everything to
a real personal level.

For example, she told her audiences of her

deep pride in her husband and generally illustrated this with an example
that most women could

understand.

Speaking of her husband's honesty,

she said this: "It's sometimes embarrassing to be married to a man who
won't tell an untruth, even to be polite.

Sometimes I will kick him

under the table when he is being too honest, and then he will ask me-right out loud—why I am kicking him."

47

Most of her speeches follow

approximately the same line of reasoning.
her husband's qualifications and abilities.

Invariably she will talk of
She speaks of his "real

genius" of being able to communicate and to bring diverse groups to
agreement and tells of how she has never known her husband to lie to her.
She speaks of his success in bringing American Motors from a state of
financial crisis to that of industry leadership and talks of his success as vice president of the Constitutional Convention,

She also

speaks of his success and concern over his family and his successful
role as a father.
In many ways Mrs. Romney was a complete contrast to her "opponent,"
46

Ibid.

47

Ibid.
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Mrs. John B. Swainson.

Mrs. Romney, 52, a grandmother, thrived on

the vigorous schedule of the campaign and often made speeches lasting
as long as one hour. Mrs. Swainson, 35, and a mother of three young
children, preferred talking to small groups on a person to person basis
and often made speeches of less than three minutes duration.

Both,

however, are similar in many ways. Both women present an extremely
striking

appearance.

Both are always appropriately dressed in the

latest fashions and both reflect the same unswerving dedication and
loyalty to their husbands' political beliefs.

Throughout the campaign

neither woman, as near as can be determined, ever said anything
derogatory about the other or any of their political opponents.
Mrs. Romney has been an important factor in her husband's success.

When they first met, as high school students in Salt Lake City,

George was immediately fascinated.

She was a member of a wealthy and

influential Salt Lake family, and George had a difficult time impressing
her.

However, as in all other things, he persisted and after following

her from Washington D. C. through New York City, back to Salt Lake, and
eventually to Los Angeles, he finally persuaded her not to accept a
movie contract she had been offered, and they were married in the Salt
Lake temple July 2,

193149

From this time on, Lenore devoted her

considerable talents to helping George ascend the ladder of success.
She is an exemplary hostess and is generally equal to any emergency.
These emergencies came often as her husband would characteristically
bring home as many as 30 people for supper.50
48
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Ibid., October 30, 1962, p. 19-A.

Mahoney,
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op. cit., p. 98.

Ibid., p. 103.
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During the campaign the Romneys' oldest son, Scott, was on a
mission in England.

He is now attending Stanford

University.

The

Romneys' two daughters, both married, did not participate in the campaign,,
The Romneys' youngest son, Mitt, sometimes traveled with his father and
other campaign aides, but was not an active participant in the campaign.
Most political analysts agree that Mrs. Romney, whose speaking
style and public image were in many ways superior to that of her husband, was an extremely positive factor in his ultimate election.

One of

her admirers expressed his feeling, after Mrs. Romney had concluded a
particularly successful speech, in this manner, "Mrs. Romney, is it too
late to run you for Governor?"51

51

The Detroit News, July 29, 1962, p. 3-A.

CHAPTER TWO

HOW IT ALL BEGAN

As a result of the now famous "Payless Pay Day" in Michigan
in April of 1959, many of Michigan's citizens realized that some type
of action must be taken.

George Romney was one of these.

In late April of 1959, George Romney and seven other leading
citizens of Michigan met at a dinner at the Sheraton-Cadillac Hotel in
Detroit, as one later described it, "to pool their frustrations."

A

second meeting the next month at the Student Union Building in Ann Arbor
included 15 individuals who here decided to form "Citizens for Michigan."
A few days later Romney called a press conference in which he announced
that approximately a hundred individuals were being asked to join this
group, not as partisans or proponents of any particular faction or group,
but solely as individual citizens.

In subsequent meetings about 300

of Michigan's leading citizens became actively engaged in working for
the goals of CFM.

Three basic committees were formed, (1) The Com-

mittee on Structure of Government, (2) The Committee on Government
Services, and (3) The Committee on Finance and

Taxation.2

In Septem-

ber, Romney was formally elected chairman of the group, a position he
had tacitly held from the outset.
Using much of the methodology gained from his school board
1

Robert McNamara, later Secretary of Defense in the KennedyJohnson administration, was included in this group.
2

Michigan Challenge, September 1961, p. 26.
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advisory committee experience plus the personal talents and abilities
of the persons who had voluntered to work in CFM, Romney and this
group vigorously began to study, analyze, and recommend changes and
improvements in all areas of Michigan government.
Every possible precaution was taken to insure that CFM did not
partake of the disabilities inherent in almost any other group then
active on the Michigan political scene.

For example, contributions

were accepted entirely on an individual basis and not from any organized
group.

No contribution of over one hundred dollars in any given year

was accepted under any circumstances.

Persons of known connection or

affiliation with any political party, political action group, labor
union, or other similar organization were discouraged (though not prohibited) from active participation in CFM.
Among other things, CFM brought to light the following facts:
Michigan's population increase in the ten years preceding 1959 was
exceeded only by Florida and California.

As one of the wealthiest

states in the Union, Michigan's treasury took in more than a billion
dollars in 1959.

Although some industry had been lost during this time,

much more new industry had been gained.

Although there were many

problems, not the least of which was the mounting unemployment, none
of these was insurmountable.

3

On the positive side of the ledger, 1959

automobile production was running considerably ahead of 1958 figures.
Sales tax collections were among the highest ever recorded in Michigan
history.

Things certainly should have been better, but they were get-

ting steadily

worse.4

3

The unemployment problem was aggravated considerably by the
closing of Packard, Hudson, and Kaiser-Frazer automobile plants that
year (1959).
4

Tom Mahoney, The Story of George Romney (New York:
1960),p.240,241.

Harper,
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One trouble CFM noted was to be found in the structure of state
government.

Michigan's constitution, though revised somewhat in 1909,

was in large measure drawn up in 1850 when the population was sparse and
almost completely

rural.

This constitution, coupled with myriads of

statutes designed to prop up many of its unsteady provisions, produced an ungainly monster incapable of concise and logical action in
many areas.

For example, many funds were earmarked for specific pur-

poses such as highway construction and could not under any circumstances
be used for other purposes.
Another problem of great moment was the impasse between longtime Democratic Governor G. Mennen Williams and the Republican-dominated
legislature.

Even in the financial crisis of April 1959, these two

were not able to get together to break the stalemate.

The first "Payless

Pay Day" involved only 325 state employees including 144 legislators.
However, by the end of the first week in May, 26,000 state workers were
unable to collect their paychecks.
A third major problem was that of taxation.

The governor and

the legislature could not agree as to the type, amount, and sources
to be used in taxing Michigan's citizens.

It was obvious to those

members of CFM studying the problem that many glaring inequities existed
and many archaic provisions still formed a major portion of Michigan's
tax structure.6
The subsequent role of CFM in working for constitutional reform,
tax reform, reapportionment, and other reforms was a significant one, and

5

6

Ibid.

Citizens For Michigan, A Program for Michigan Tax Reform (Institute of Public Administration: University of Michigan, December 1961),
pp. 1-5.
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will be treated as it is pertinent to our study.

CFM was a major

factor in bringing about many important changes in Michigan government
as well as bringing the level of politics in Michigan to a much higher
plane.

Romney's participation in CFM led directly to the next step he

was to take in climbing the ladder that was to lead to the governorship of Michigan.
•The story of the fight for a new constitution by the Citizens
for Michigan organization is an inspiring story of democracy in action.
In order to understand its significance to the campaign and the role
played by George Romney in the calling and subsequent meeting of the
convention, it is necessary to review briefly its history.
Article 27 of the Michigan constitution

provided that the

question of a constitutional convention could be put before the voters
at any time by a simple majority vote in both Houses.

This constitu-

tion also required that this question be submitted to the people at
16 year intervals beginning in 1926.

A constitutional amendment in

1913 provided that the people could initiate a call for a constitutional
convention by petitions signed by qualified electors of the state.8
These provisions indicated the concern of the framers that the constitution be revised from time to time to adjust to future political situations that could not be anticipated during the early years of the
constitution.

According to the constitutional provisions, the conven-

tion would have power to amend or revise the constitution to any
extent it felt was necessary, including the drafting of a completely
new document.
7

1908 version.

8

The number of signatures was to be at least 10 percent of the
total vote for governor in the last election.
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In keeping with the constitutional provisions, the question
was placed on the ballot in 1926 and again in 1942.
was defeateda
on the ballot.

In both cases it

In 1948, the legislature voted to have the question placed
This time it was passed by a simple majority of those

voting on the question.

The State Supreme Court, however, ruled that

the constitutional requirement for passage was a majority of those voting
in the election--not simply the majority of those voting on the question.
Under the constitutional provisions, the question came up again in 1958
(at the 16 year interval) and again lost by virtue of the Court's rulings
In both the 1948 and 1958 elections the League of Women Voters
had campaigned strenuously for a constitutional convention.

In 1948

the League was joined by many other civic groups, notably the Michigan
Junior Chamber of Commerce.
When the 1958 vote was thrown out, a movement was started by
these groups to have the question placed on the ballot in 1959 by
legislative resolution.

The legislature, however, failed to act and

for a time the constitutional convention idea seemed doomed.

Then in

1959, the state experienced its famous "Payless Pay Day" that resulted in much unfavorable publicity throughout the nation.

Many of

the problems leading to this situation were blamed upon constitutional restrictions which earmarked certain funds and which placed many
illogical restrictions on both the legislative and executive branches
of the government.
This event fanned the smoldering embers of constitutional revision into a roaring flame,

Michigan's 356 daily and weekly news-

papers and 109 radio and T.V. stations all got into the act.

Not

all favored revision, but the majority--especially those in the large
metropolitan areas--did.

They succeeded admirably in making the
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citizens aware of the problem and its issues.
The League and the J.C.C. took the ball from there.

They

realized that before a convention could be called it would be necessary
to amend the constitution to provide for approval by a simple majority
of those voting on the question.

Accordingly, a constitutional amend-

ment embodying this change was drawn up and prepared in petition form.
This amendment provided for the election of Constitutional Convention
delegates on the basis of one delegate for each State Representative
and corrected an obvious point of confusion by providing that the convention should convene at the capital city instead of at the capitol
as was stated in the 1908 version of the constitution.

The petitions

were printed and the 3000 members of the League and the 6000 members of
the J.C.C. began the leg work of obtaining signatures.
Meanwhile, in April of 1959, Citizens for Michigan was formed
at Lansing and immediately began a close study of the constitutional
convention proposal.

In May of 1960, CFM endorsed the program of the

League and J.C.C. and added its assistance.

To this point these groups

had succeeded in obtaining only 85,000 signatures and were seriously
handicapped by lack of funds. The deadline (July 8, 1960) for filing
petitions was only six weeks away.
CFM immediately raised $10,800 which was used for printing
100,000 petitions and mailing them to organizations friendly to the
constitutional convention, which by then had been dubbed "ConCon."
Next a coordinating committee was formed, and rallies and special
events were staged throughout the state.

With the added boost pro-

vided by the executive talent of CFM, more than 300,000 signatures were
obtained by the
9

deadline.9

The propositions proposed by the petitions

0nly 231,000 were required.
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were presented to the people in the November 1960 election and were
approved.
It now became necessary for the question to be put on the ballot in the April 1961 election.
voting on the issue.

It passed by a simple majority of those

The convention was subsequently called, and con-

vened in October of 1961. 10
The convention was held in the Civic Center at Lansing, and
lasted seven and one-half months.

Each delegate received a salary of

$1000 per month plus expenses.
His interest whetted by the active part he had played in the
calling of the convention, Romney ran for and was elected as a delegate
to represent Oakland county at the Constitutional Convention.

He began

his term of service October 3, 1961.
Romney soon became one of the leading lights at the convention.
He was elected a vice-president and wielded considerable influence in
most of the decisions made regarding constitutional changes.
On Friday, May 11, 1962, the 144 delegates completed 136 days
of deliberation and adjourned until August 1, 1962.

At the August

meeting, last minute changes in phraseology were made, and the constitution was officially submitted to the Secretary of State.

Submission

of the new constitution was the final act of the convention, and upon
its completion, the convention was officially dissolved.
Changes made in the constitution were many and extremely significant.

The net result was that the entire constitution was considerably

streamlined, changed and shortened.

10

Michigan

11

Challenge, September 1961, pp. 3-5, 26.

Ibid., p. 20.
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The executive branch was altered to a significant degree.

The

Governor's term, as well as those of the other major elected officials,
was changed from two to four years.

Provision was made for the Lieu-

tenant Governor to be nominated with, run as a teammate of, and be
elected along with the Governor.

Most of the principal executive

department heads, with the exception of the Secretary of State and Attorney General, were made appointive on the basis of expertise rather
than elective as under the old constitution.

Provision was made for

the appointment of a competent Highway Commissioner.

Michigan was

formerly the only state with an elected Highway Commissioner.
The former 120 State Boards and Commissions were consolidated
into twenty principal departments.

The Governor now has the option to

reorganize the executive branch, subject to legislative approval, to
12
maintain the most effective and timely executive action.
The legislative branch was also considerably modified.

The

House of Representatives was to continue to be composed of 110 members,
elected for 2-year terms.

A new formula replaced the apportionment

provisions with a precise mathematical formula, the same one used for
allocating the national Congressional seats.
were exclusively provided for.

Single-member districts

Provisions were made to guard against

"gerrymandering."
In the Senate, the term was raised from two to four years.
Four more seats were added making a total of 38.

Beginning in 1966,

the Senators will be elected in non-presidential election years as was
similarly provided for the Governor, thus focusing more attention on
state issues.

2

The Senate apportionment provision is based 80 percent

Ibid., June 1962, pp. 8-11.
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on population and 20 percent on area.
Reapportionment was provided for at 10 year intervals.

A

special bipartisan apportionment committee was provided for this purpose.

A strong anti-discrimination clause was added, and most of the

election details were left up to the legislature. The taxation,
finance, and business provisions of the constitution were streamlined
and made to provide more advantages to business in order to make
Michigan more attractive in this respect.

13

In the judicial branch a unified, modern, five-tier court system
was established.
jurisdiction.

The legislature can now only create courts of limited

Previously it could establish any court inferior to the

Supreme Court.
The number of Supreme Court justices was fixed at seven with an
eight-year term of office.

The Chief Justice is to be selected by the

members of the Supreme Court.

In addition to the Supreme Court, the

other four types of courts created were:

Courts of Appeal, Circuit

Courts, Probate Courts, and Administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial
status.

The Justice of the Peace courts were eliminated, and the legis-

lature was given five years to develop courts of limited jurisdiction*

14

Immediately upon the publication of the proposed constitution,
Governor Swainson, along with other leading Democrats and labor
leaders, spoke out violently in opposition to it.

John C. Mackie, the

Highway Commissioner, was appointed by Governor Swainson to analyze the
new constitution.

Soon Mackie and others who opposed the new constitution

came up with the following criticisms of it.

13

Ibid., June 1962, pp. 6-18.
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Ibid., pp. 11-23.

They claimed the
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apportionment formula was "obscure and unclear" and that the legislature
would have "blanket approval" to raid highway funds.

The executive

branch, the Democrats stated, was "seriously weakened."

They pointed

out that the right to elect state officials was taken away and that
the Senate's power to obstruct executive appointments was expanded*
Governor Swainson charged that the "most flagrant abuse" was
the abolition of the office of State Highway Commissioner.

The Mackie

report also denounced the constitution by saying it was written "by a
selfish few in secret meetings off the convention floor, and beyond
the pole of public scrutiny, after agreeing to an open

convention."16

From the very beginning, the constitutional battle was drawn
along partisan lines.

The Democrats used their control of the executive

branch and their labor support to fight against the new document, and
the Republicans used their control of the legislature, and their businness and industry ties to fight for it.

The Republicans charged that

Commissioner Mackie had "forced" many of Michigan's highway builders
and contractors to "contribute" to a fund to fight the new constitution.17

This fund did exist, but it was never proved that there had

been any pressure exerted to collect it.
In addition to the Republicans, many non-partisan groups, such
as civic committees, P.T.A. groups, and other organizations, joined
forces to fight for the constitution.
15

The efforts of these groups

The Detroit News, June 10, 1962, p. 14-B.

l6

The Detroit Free Press, June 3, 1962, pp. 1, 2-A. Two possible reasons for this Democratic and labor opposition could be (1) they
felt the reforms did not go far enough, e.g., they felt the apportionment
provisions should be on a "one man, one vote" basis, and (2) they felt
Romney was using the constitution as a political stepping stone.
Ibid., July 31, 1962, p. 1.
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were considerable and did much to educate the public as to the issues
involved.

As the issues became better known, it became obvious that

support for the new constitution was also growing. The Democratic
charges of the great cost involved in producing the new document

18

were

overshadowed by the benefits promised by the Republicans and the
other groups supporting its adoption. The hard core of opposition remained in the Democratic party and the labor unions and this opposition
probably was a significant factor in changing the minds of some of the
normally Democratic voters who voted for Romney in the election.
After the convention had completed all but the final day of its
sessions, the new document was unofficially presented to state officials
in May of 1962. This presentation was made with the idea in mind of
having the constitution put on the ballot in the November election,
to be voted on at the same time the governor was to be elected.

As no

action was taken by the Democratic officials who were responsible for
such action, a suit was filed by ConCon officers to require the Democratic officials to put the question on the November ballot.
From the time of the filing of the suit until late July there
ensued a series of legal movements by the Attorney General, Circuit
Court, judges, and ConCon lawyers; the upshot of which was a delay of
action until it was too late to have the constitution put on the
19
November ballot.
When the Constitutional Convention met on August 1 for its final
session, a few minor changes in the constitution were made and final
recommendations were formulated for the procedure that was to be
18

The total cost of the convention was near two million dollars.

19

The Detroit News, June 6, 1962, p. 1.
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followed in presenting the constitution to the voters.

The suit to have

the constitution placed on the November ballot was formally abandoned,
and the convention unanimously recommended that the constitution be submitted to the voters in the election of April 1963,

20

As a consequence of these events, the ConCon issue was virtually dropped as an active element of the campaign.

It is thought,

however, that its influence was still significant to the final outcome
of the election, as it had been a key issue during most of the campaign,
and many voters had expressed strong opinions concerning it.
The constitution was submitted to the voters in the April election as directed and was passed by a close majority.

20
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Ibid., August 2, 1962, p. 12-A.
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Deseret News, April 2, 1963, p. 1*
807,847, yes; and 796,223, no.

The final count was

CHAPTER THREE

A CAMPAIGN EMERGES

As the news releases were made public during the course of the
Constitutional Convention, more often than not George Romney's name
would be included, or his opinion would be solicited by a reporter and
quoted in connection with the item.

Already a well-known public figure

because of his success in the automobile industry, his name became even
better known throughout Michigan, this time as a figure on the political
scene.
As was inevitable, speculation began as to Romney's future in
the political arena.

The rumors began:

Romney was thinking of running

for the U. S. Senate, House of Representatives, State Senate, or even
Governor.

At first Romney's public pronouncements indicated he had no

such intentions.

But as he became more deeply involved in the convention,

the indications became stronger that George Romney, automaker, was
seriously considering becoming George Romney, politician.
His approach to this new challenge was typically Romney,
thorough and complete, almost meticulous in some respects, yet in the
end, somewhat impetuous.

He talked to his many confidential friends,

many of whom were the business, financial, and in some cases, political
leaders of the state.

He let a few feelers out to the news media to

test the public reaction, and according to those who know him best, he
made it a matter of fervent, personal prayer.
but mostly encouraging.
35

The reaction was varied,
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At last the time came when a decision had to be made.
factors involved in this decision were complex.

The

His work at the con-

vention was ending; he would have the time to devote to a campaign.
The Democrats were coming out strongly against the new constitution;
someone who thoroughly believed in and understood the new constitution
would be needed to fight for its adoption.

His years of effort at

American Motors were bearing fruit; he could leave the company in the
capable hands of those who had helped him pull it back into industry
leadership.

Perhaps most significant of all, here was a new challenge.

Machine politics, labor union domination, and the intrenched groups,
both in the governor's chair and the legislative seats, needed to be
cleaned out,

A new face would be refreshing, and was, in fact, badly

needed, in either the Democratic or the Republican camps.
George realized his background had inadvertently prepared him
to meet these challenges, perhaps better than any other person in
Michigan.

He had extensive contacts with both major factions in Michi-

gan politics, labor and industry.

His unprecedented profit sharing

program at American Motors had put him on a first-name basis with all
the important labor union officials, such as August Scholle, president
of Michigan's AFL-CIO, and Walter Reuther, United Auto Workers president.
Reuther even went so far as to say that Romney's action was "the most
significant and historic collective-bargaining agreement ever signed
in the United

States."1

His "personal diplomacy" policy with the workers

in the plants controlled by AMC, which include such companies as Kelvinator, earned him literally thousands of friends among the rank-andfile of the labor unions.

1

Steward Alsop, "George Romney: The GOP's Fast Comer," The
Saturday Evening Post, May 26, 1962, p. 20.
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His contacts in the business world were equally impressive.

His

friends included many of the leading executives at corporations such as
General Motors, as well as many of the other leading business organizations of the state.

He had long been a leader in business and

industrial groups and organizations, both in and out of the state of
Michigan.

In short, he had all the natural advantages of Republican

backing if he should decide to run; these included business and the
always-Republican outstate2 vote, plus a significant possibility of
penetration into the areas of traditional Democratic dominance--the
urban-labor population.

His experiences with the Detroit public schools,

Citizens for Michigan and the Constitutional Convention, gave him a
substantial background and deep insight into the intricacies of state
government and especially the problem areas where reform was urgently
needed.
The negative side, too, presented substantial factors.

Romney

was a political novice, and excluding his position as a ConCon delegate,
he had never held public office.

To aspire to the governorship of one

of the key states in the union was a jump of considerable magnitude.
The office itself had not been in Republican hands for fourteen years.
The urban-labor-Democratic strength was growing--the strength of the
Republicans was in turn diminishing.

To run as a Republican would be

swimming upstream against a strong current.

Romney had misgivings about

identifying himself with either party, as he felt both were dominated
by pressure groups who were setting aside the wishes of the general
public in favor of their own selfish ends.
The Michigan State Legislature also presented its problems.

2

"Outstate"
is the Michigan term for the areas outside of
metropolitian Detroit.
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The "Old Guard" Republicans had dominated this body for years and could
prove to be as much a source of opposition to Romney's reform ideas
as the Democrats.

Not only would he have to run against the incumbent

Democrats, but also many of the incumbant Republicans.
There was his family to consider.

Could they stand the glare

of constant publicity and the inevitable mud-slinging that was sure to
arise in a Michigan political battle?

What about his religion?

He held

a high ecclesiastical office in the LDS church which was an important
part of his life.

This would have to be given up.

Also, there were

theological questions that would arise and might cause his church a considerable amount of unfavorable publicity.

Beneath all these factors

ran an undercurrent that eventually swept all these factors into their
proper perspective. This undercurrent was, in reality, the key to
George Romney's lifelong actions and can only be described as his own
personal morality.

This was that something that had always set him

apart from other men and that had driven him to risk his reputation on
several previous occasions in order to act in accordance with his
personal convictions of duty and of right and wrong.

It was not a ques-

tion of political glory or personal ambition, but a question of duty and
of moral responsibility.
On February 10, 1962, after a period of personal fasting and
prayer, George Romney announced his decision to the world.

He would be

a candidate for the governorship of the state of Michigan.

He had done

it because he felt it was his responsiblity.
In spite of its moral undercurrent, his decision stood up well
under the light of the hard realities of practical politics.

Notably the Negro question.

See Chapter Six.

George
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Romney had not, as some had attempted to intimate, spent his entire
decision-making time in seclusion, fasting and praying for guidance.

He

had drawn upon his tremendous reservoir of friends and acquaintances and
had come up with all the facts and figures necessary to make an objective decision.

Most important of all, he had found and gained the

support of many people.

Some of these were long-time acquaintances,

others he met in the process of talking and gathering facts.
willing to do what they could to help him get elected.

All were

In a well planned

series of meetings, lunches and discussions, Romney chose his skeleton
campaign organization.

Long before he made his decision, he knew in

considerable detail the resources upon which he could draw, should he
decide to run.

When he made the final decision, his organization was

ready to go, and go it did.

Although certainly not political profes-

sionals, the staff was composed of well qualified men and women from
all aspects of Michigan citizenry and was among the best that could be
assembled at any price from the considerable amount of talent available.
Some of the key persons deserve attention.
Arthur George Elliott Jr., George Romney's 5-foot-4 campaign
manager, expressed the belief that every citizen has the responsibility
to select the political party that best represents his interests and
beliefs and to work within that party.

Says Art, "My political work

is simply my manner of discharging that responsibility."

4

4

"The mighty mite," as he is called by Romney, was born in
Indianapolis, Indiana, in October of 1916. He graduated from high
school in 1933 and spent three years at Michigan State University. He
spent five years in the United States Army (1940-45) during which time
he rose from the rank of private to captain. He is a family and
church man, a former president of the Ferndale (Michigan) Rotary Club,
a former member of the Oakland County Board of Supervisors, past
chairman of the Ferndale City Commission, and an active participant
in the Chamber of Commerce and the Boy Scouts. He and his wife
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At the time of the campaign, he was a partner with his brother
Jack in a Royal Oak real estate, insurance, and building company.
Art began his political career in 1952, when, at the insistance
of his wife, he ran for precinct delegate from their hometown of
Pleasant Ridge.
state.

Pleasant Ridge was then the largest precinct in the

He and his door-to-door crew turned out 95% of the potential

precinct vote.

After this, his rise to political leadership was swift.

During the 1954 elections, he served as regional campaign director for
the Republican Party.

Two years later he headed the Oakland County

delegation to the state Republican Convention.
named county director of the presidential

Later on in 1956, he was

campaign.

In 1957, the Oakland

County Republican Chairman resigned, and Elliott succeeded him.

As

chairman of the Oakland County Republican party, Elliott caused a complete revolution of the GOP in that county.

As the 1960 election ap-

proached, he mobilized the county as had never been done before.

In

keeping with his belief that the party should broaden the base of its
participation, he organized a county-wide network of women's clubs.
Existing men's clubs were doubled and all aspects of the organization
were strengthened.

He pioneered new programs with regard to education,

research, public relations, special events and financing.

Elliott

made realities of such activities as a county-wide, door-to-door, finance
drive which doubled the former high in contributions; a volunteer

voter

registration drive; and a "band wagon" that toured shopping centers,
business districts, and residential areas passing out campaign literature and buttons.

As a result of these activities, the county GOP

candidates won 24 out of the 27 races.

President Kennedy carried Michigan,

Betty have three sons, Arthur III, 18 and a student at Kalamazoo College;
Tom, 15; and David 13.
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but not Oakland, the state's second most populous county.
Elliott was next elected as one of Oakland County's seven representatives to the Constitutional Convention.

At the convention, he

served as chairman of the Local Government Committee and as a member
of the Legislative Organization Committee.

On May 17, 1962, George

Romney announced that he had chosen Arthur George Elliott Jr. to be
his campaign manager.
Lucille Kaplinger, assistant and secretary to Mr. Elliott, is
holder of a B.A. degree from Michigan State University in History
and Social Science.

She also holds two Master's degrees from the Uni-

versity of Michigan, one in education and one in political science.
She has taught for a number of years at Saginaw High School in Saginaw,
Michigan, and holds a Michigan State Jr. College teacher's certificate.
She worked as administrative assistant to the president of the Constitutional Convention, from which position she was asked to work with the
Romney for Governor staff.

At the time of the campaign, she held a fel-

lowship at Michigan State University for Ph.D. work in political science
which was being held for her until the completion of the campaign.
Dr. Walter DeVries, research director, holds his B.A., M.A.,
and Ph.D. from Michigan State University in political science.

While

attending Michigan State University, he worked in the office of the
Speaker of the House as an assistant.

He did such an outstanding job,

that upon his graduation, the job was made a permanent position, and
he held it for another five years.

During the campaign he was on leave

of absence from Calvin College where he was a member of the Department
of Political Science.

He was chairman of the Administrative Committee

of the Constitutional Convention, and from this position was asked by
Romney and Elliott to serve on the campaign staff.
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Phil 0. Pittenger, scheduling director, is a former executive
secretary of the Chamber of Commerce of Howell, Michigan.

He was

formerly executive director of the Lansing Clinic in Lansing, Michigan,
and has served in several significant positions in the public relations
field.

He worked as scheduling director for Paul Bagwell, unsuccessful

Republican gubernatorial candidate, in both the 1958 and 1960 campaigns.
Other members of the staff included Clyde Bennett, a professional
free lance advertising agent who was in charge of making up advertising
copy, radio and TV programs, and all paid advertisements, brochures,
bumper stickers, etc; Richard Milliman, press aide, a former assistant
to the mayor of Lansing, and a newspaperman of long standing in Lansing
and other areas of the state, and Charles Tucker.

Richard, along with

George Trumbull, his assistant, were in charge of all publicity and
press releases, as well as television and other coverage.

Richard

traveled with Romney, and George worked in campaign headquarters in
Detroit.

Tucker, a Negro, was in charge of the civil rights publicity

and other activities of the campaign.

Jeannette Weiss, campaign head-

quarters receptionist, is also a Negro.
The fund raising was done entirely by volunteer personnel.

The

volunteers included the fund raising chairman, Max Fisher, an executive
of New Monarch Company, a fast growing Michigan industrial firm.

He

has had considerable experience as chairman of United Fund drives and
other drives of this nature.

The fund raising was handled through

various groups, such as the Romney Volunteers, and the Romney for
Governor staff.

Various "ad hoc" committees were set up for door-to-

door campaigns, fund raising breakfasts, and other activities of similar
nature.

There was an extensive effort to get contributions of one dol-

lar or less from the common voter--not so much for the value of the
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contribution, but for the commitment which it implied.

The Romney

Volunteers distributed a coin holder which could be filled with dimes
and sent in to Romney headquarters.
daily.

Several of these were returned

Each day's mail brought checks in various amounts ranging from

one dollar to five hundred

dollars.

most came from local voters.

Some came from out of state, but

According to Miss Kaplinger, a letter

personally observed by the author was typical.

It contained a check

accompanied by a small note reading something like this; "We need good
men like George Romney in government, success in the coming campaign."
The Romney staff made no attempt to solicit money through the regular
Republican organization, although it did receive a portion of the state
funds from the State Central Committee.

According to Romney staff

officials, finances were not one of the major problems of the campaign.
Total expenditures, as reported by the State Republican and
Democratic Party committees, as required by law, at the close of the
campaign, show that the loser, Governor Swainson, spent $230,850, while
the winner, Romney, spent only $193,927.
Both the Republicans and Democrats collected more money than
they spent on the campaign.

The Democrats collected approximately

$500 more than they spent while the Republicans came out some $6000 in
the black.6

D

The Detroit News, November 28, 1962, p. 2-C.

6

Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR

After the key campaign personnel had been chosen, things began
to happen in the rapid, well-organized way that was to characterize
the Romney campaign.
The first major step was to lease the entire sixth floor of the
Detroit Industrial Building, one of the prominent office buildings
in downtown Detroit.

This done, each major staff member, previously

mentioned, began to set up his or her "department" and to chose personnel and facilities according to their needs.

This included the

selection of secretaries, research assistants, receptionists, telephone
switchboard operators, drivers, various necessary office personnel,
and the purchase or rental of various office supplies and equipment.
A major task at this time was the design, selection, and purchase of
the standard accouterments of campaigning, including Romney buttons,
bumper stickers, hats, lapel and tie pins, tracts and pamphlets, and
other related items.
During this early period, detailed plans were laid covering
the entire campaign period, including policy decisions on advertising
and publicity methods; how and when the state would be covered and
areas of concentration.

Speech and other public appearance policies

were formulated and these events were scheduled, for the most part,
months in advance.
Every two weeks during the campaign, a confidential schedule
was distributed to key members of the staff.
44

This schedule was
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compiled under the direction of Phil Pittenger and contained an hourby-hour, day-by-day schedule of the activities of the campaign,,

In

many ways, this schedule was the key to the smoothness of the campaign,
as it allowed all key people to know just what was taking place at any
given moment.

The schedule was of especial value to Romney himself,

as it contained pertinent information about each situation he would
encounter throughout the day's activities.

Thus he would know how many

people to expect at a rally or a picnic, what their backgrounds were,
who the key people were he was to encounter, their political persuasion and significance, where meals and rest periods had been arranged,
and exact times of all functions, including estimated travel times and
routes.
As the campaign progressed, Mrs. Romney's role in it increased.
Her itinerary became similar, although not as heavy as that of her
husband, and a similar schedule was published for her.
The advance men handled the momentous task of arranging all
the details of these schedules.

Under the direction of Phil Pittenger,

this group of six to eight men would telephone, write, visit, time,
arrange, and then evaluate all situations well in advance of Romney's
visits so there would be little time wasted by mistakes, waiting, and
other problems arising from lack of coordination.

These men did a

tremendous job of seeing to it that all the right people were at the
proper places at the proper times; that newspapers and other media
were informed of schedules, and events; that literature, microphones,
and other supplies were available when needed; and that people were
available to pass out literature and to perform other necessary
functions at all appearances.
Early in the campaign, Romney established a private headquarters
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in downtown Detroit at the Pick Fort Shelby Hotel, which is located a
few blocks from the Industrial

Building.

This was used for high-level

strategy sessions, important conferences of staff personnel and others,
and for Romney's daily rest and study periods when he was in the
Detroit area.
The campaign staff resembled a well-oiled, capable machine by
the time the nominating petitions were filed June 18, 1962.

Both

candidates waited until the day before the deadline to file their petitions with the Secretary of State.
Governor Swainson, accompanied by his wife Alice, arrived at
9 a.m. with a petition containing 50,000 signatures from all 83 counties.
George Romney, accompanied by his wife Lenore and their son
Mitt, arrived at 9:30.

Romney's petition contained a record number

of 70,000 signatures.
Both candidates were well over the minimum statutory requirements.

Swainson needed 17,539 signatures and Romney needed 14,542.

These figures represent one percent of the vote cast for democratic
and Republican candidates for Secretary of State in the last state wide
election (I960). 2
Both Romney and Swainson were unopposed in the primary.

Al-

though it was originally thought that both candidates would have opposition, at filing time no other candidates had materialized.
The candidates for other statewide offices were many and campaigns were lively.

Two offices are particularly notable, those of

Lieutenant Governor

and Congressman-at--Large.

1

The Detroit Free Press, June 19, 1962, p. 1.

2

Ibid.
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The Democratic candidate for Lieutenant Governor was the incumbent, T. John Lesinski, who was unopposed in the primary.

Competing

for the Republican spot on the ticket was Clarence A. Reid, a 69 yearold, 277-pound political veteran.
(1952-54),

Reid, a former Lieutenant Governor

is a political enigma in Michigan.

His political assets

seem to consist of his ample frame, a high pitched squeaky voice, a lot
of friends made from many years as a lawyer and politician,
fact that he gets votes.

and the

Reid's two opponents for the Republican

nomination for Lieutenant Governor were John H. Stahlin, a 48 year-old
manufacturing company president and a former state senator (4 years);
and Rockwell T. Gust Jr., a 38 year-old, self-styled conservative and
a militant Barry Goldwater fan.

Both Stahlin and Gust were well

organized and fought extremely hard to be Romney's running mate.
lin had six full-time staff members, and Gust had ten,

Stah-

Reid had none

and usually spent his mornings in his Detroit law office.

What little

campaigning he did was done in the afternoons and evenings.

Asked why

he was running for office, Reid stated simply, "I like the work."
The Congressman-at-Large race shaped up as a contest between
Republican Alvin M. Bentley and Democrat Neil Staebler.
unopposed in the primary.

Both were

The failure of the Legislature to reappor-

tion during the last session made necessary the statewide at-large
election.
Bentley, a 43 year-old vice president of a broadcasting corporation, has served as a U. S. Foreign Service officer, a Congressional

3

This was the last time a Republican held the office in the state.

He was a State Senator for ten years and has represented many
union officials in legal actions.
The Detroit Free Press, July 30, 1962, p. 2B.
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Representative, and as a delegate to the recent Constitutional Convention, and has had many years of business experience in Michigan.
Staebler, 56, is a realtor and land developer and has held
positions in retail petroleum, distributing, and retail coal saleSo

He

has served on presidential commissions and as a government consultant
under presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy.6
An interesting aspect of the primary campaign was the number
of Republicans seeking lesser local offices who used the Romney charisma
as a vehicle in their own campaigns.

Such phrases as "My friend,

George Romney" and "The unbeatable team,
were common throughout the campaign.

Romney and

,"

In addition to this, portions of

photographs were clipped or otherwise remanufactured to show the candidate in a very personal relationship with George Romney.
The actual campaign aspects of the primary election will be
considered in the total context of the general campaign, so only the
results will be considered in this chapter.

The final tally in the

primary election, which was held August 7, 1962, gave George Romney a
4-3 margin over Governor Swainson in what shaped up to be little more
than a popularity contest,,
Swainson's totaled

318,396.8

Romney's votes totaled 446,398 while
In the Lieutenant Governor race,

Clarence Reid did it again, winning by a comfortable margin over Stah9
lin and Gust who finished in that order.
This election served more as an indicator of the relative

6

The Detroit News, August 1, 1962, p. 1-F.

7

Ibid., August 5, 1962, p. 1.

8

Ibid., Aupust 8, 1962, p. 1.

9

Ibid.
Gust, 104,767.

The final count was Reid 194,567; Stahlin, 121,049; and
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strength of the gubernatorial candidates, showing areas needing more
attention and indicating public opinion on various issues.

Other

conclusions that could be drawn from the election include the demonstration of a surprising amount of dissatisfaction among the outstate voters
with the

legislature.

Many of the "Old Guard," both Democrats and

Republicans, were replaced by younger and more liberal individuals.
A large number of these new faces on the Michigan political scene were
those who recently received their political baptism as delegates to
the Constitutional Convention.
Romney drew nearly 350,000 of his votes from the outstate areas
of the state.

This was seventy-one percent of the vote outside of

Wayne County.

His Wayne County percentage was just over thirty-five.

This outstate support was probably due in part at least to Romney's
stand in the Constitutional Convention on reapportionment.

12

These

facts which indicated strong support from outstate voters, were major
factors in Romney's decision to concentrate his campaign efforts in
Wayne County and greater Detroit.
Although most pre-election prognoses predicted a record vote in
the primary of over one million votes, the final total was somewhat less
than 850,000. 13
Romney, as well as Swainson, discounted the significance of the
primary results as not necessarily giving a thorough picture of

10

11

The Detroit Free Press, August 9, 1962, p. 6-A.

The

Detroit News, August 9, 1962, pp. 1, 15-A.

12

Romney had strongly opposed the straight population basis
for apportionment, which would have greatly reduced outstate representation in the legislature.
13

The Deseret News, August 8, 1962, p. 1.
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political conditions and voter preference in the state.

The fact that

there were many offices, notably the gubernatorial contest, where
the candidates were unopposed in the primary, probably accounted for
the voter turnout being less than was expected.

CHAPTER FIVE

ROMNEY VOLUNTEERS

Early in the campaign, an organization was instituted which
played an extremely significant role in the enlistment of "grass roots"
support for the Romney

candidacy.

This was the Romney Volunteers.

Entirely separate from the Romney for Governor staff and the Republican
party organizations, the Volunteers was organized to utilize the talents
of independent, inactive Republicans, who were not working with any
segment of their party; independents who supported Romney; and of
Democrats who did not want to give up their party loyalties, but who
nevertheless wanted to support and work for Romney's election.

The

Volunteers rented a large portion of the fifth floor of the Industrial
Building in Detroit, just one floor below the one occupied by the Romney staff.

Little conflict was experienced between the Volunteers and

the regular Republican and campaign organizations, and in nearly all
cases the Volunteers worked to supplement these other organizations.
Dr. John T. Dempsey, professor of political science at the
University of Michigan (Dearborn Center) served as state chairman of the
Romney Volunteers.

Dr. Dempsey, a Detroit native, is a World War II

veteran who, in addition to membership in many political science associations, has worked extensively in educational television and television
news broadcasting.

A long time Democrat, he was formerly legislative

assistant to Senator Thomas Hennings of Missouri and he also served as
legislative assistant to Representative Stewart Udall of Arizona.
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The
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executive director of the state organization of Romney Volunteers during the campaign was Miss Hilary Whittaker.

Miss Whittaker, also a

native Detroiter, received her B.A. from Vassar College and her M.A.
from Wayne State

University.

She has also studied under a Ford Foun-

dation grant for television specialization.

For the three years

preceding the campaign she was a director of American Red Cross Centers
in Morocco and

France.

She has worked as an international news cor-

respondent and as an international coordinator of Red Cross activities.
In addition, she has worked extensively in publicity and recreational
activities for New York City and has had considerable experience in
the field of advertising.

For five years she worked on the television

staff of Wayne State University where she produced public service and
adult educational TV programs as well as issuing news releases and
writing feature stories for local and national publications.
also taught classes in publicity and script writing.

She has

Under the primary

direction of Miss Whittaker and Dr. Dempsey, the Volunteers was organized,
staffed, and functioned throughout the campaign.
The Romney Volunteers operated in this manner.

The Central

Committee, headquartered at Detroit, divided the state into "communities."

A community, by Romney Volunteer definition, is any geographical

area which the activity of a particular Volunteer unit would encompass.
A particular "community" would vary from one or more counties in a
rural area to a ward or portion of a ward in a major urban area.

This

designation was flexible and was worked out in co-operation with central
headquarters in Detroit.
A typical local organization of Romney Volunteers came into
existence in the following manner.

Interested people made themselves

known by various means, such as by referral or by personally
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volunteering, and were then designated as an area chairman.

These

were generally people of recognized community leadership and ability
(but never partisan

leadership).

As soon as contact with this particu-

lar individual was made, he (or she) then received a set of booklets
from the Romney Volunteer headquarters in Detroit which supplied the
chairman-designate with all information, manuals, publications, instructions, etc., necessary to begin activities.

This information gen-

erally included activities necessary for coordination with other chapters, contact with George Romney and his campaign staff, information
about the Romney campaign, scheduled appearances with Romney and other
major campaign activities of importance as well as channels of assistance
and other helps available for special problems.
The area chairman was responsible for establishing the Organizing or Steering Committee.

To assist him, he would choose a vice

chairman who was usually a leading woman in the community (if the chairman was a man).

Ladies were encouraged and given positions of leader-

ship whenever possible as they generally did a large share of the work.
In addition to the chairman, and vice chairman, the Steering Committee
was composed of five other persons with proven leadership ability in
the community who were chosen to be the heads of the five key committees:

Publicity, Activities, Membership, Headquarters, and Finance.

These seven persons then met together and selected people from all important segments of the community including church groups, service
clubs, ethnic and minority groups and many other persons of this
nature, and invited them to an organization meeting. The Steering
Committee, composed of these seven persons became a permanent advisory
committee to the volunteer organization.
At the organization meeting, chapter officers would be
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elected and a chapter neme would be chosen (e.g. the Romney Volunteers of the 19th Postal District). A timetable would be established
which included planning for membership drives, organizing special days
such as "Romney Bumper Sticker Day," finding and setting up headquarters space. and holding of coffee caucuses.

It was usually planned

that the chapter should open and maintain headquarters in a convenient
public location from sometime in September right up to election day.
Each special activity, such as "Bumper Sticker Day," undertaken
by the chapter was under the direction of a special committee composed
of as many people as possible.

This way a maximum number of people

were able to participate in the campaign and thus to identify themselves
solidly with Romney.
The two main activities of the chapters were (1) publicity,
and (2) person to person contact.
the various committees.

These goals were accomplished through

The first of these was the Publicity Committee

whose activities centered around keeping the newspapers, radio, and
television stations aware of chapter activities, especially those of
local interest.

Whenever possible, personal contact was made with local

editors of newspapers and other media encouraging their support of
Romney.

A letter writing force was enlisted to write letters of com-

mendation to newspapers and other media who gave Romney favorable publicity and to criticize any unfavorable articles.

Romney buttons,

handouts, and other materials were all made available by the chapter.
A speaker's bureau was established which took advantage of every
opportunity to tell the Romney story to interested groups by providing an articulate and convincing speaker.

The chapter worked in

cooperation with local party headquarters in buying time and space
in newspapers, radio, television, and other media.
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The Activities Committee was responsible for person to person
contact—to get as many individuals as possible contacted and asked to
vote for Romney (and whenever possible, work with the Volunteer committee).

Some of the means employed by this committee were public ral-

lies, coffee caucuses, neighbor to neighbor canvassing, telephone campaigns, free baby sitters, poll watchers, voter checkoffs, and transportation to the polls on election day.

These activities proved to be

extremely effective in enlisting "grass roots" support and in getting
out the vote on election day.
The Membership Committee had the specific responsibility of
seeing that new people were contacted throughout the life of the chapter,
both individually and through various groups to which they belonged,
such as veteran's, women's, youth, labor, ethnic, business, professional,
and fraternal organizations.

For teenagers, dances and similar events

were scheduled to bring them in contact with the organization and to
have them participate in the campaign.

As the campaign progressed, many

other ingenious ways of recruiting members were developed.
The Headquarters Committee was in charge of maintaining and
staffing the chapter headquarters.

This included the keeping of a

membership file and other necessary records, handling and mailing of
supplies, supplying information, and seeing that each volunteer was
assigned a specific, meaningful task.
The Finance Committee was in charge of collecting all money,
budgeting funds, and keeping track of expenditures.

Each chapter was

theoretically self supporting, providing its own funds by donations
or by selling membership cards or by both of these methods.
1

The chapters were self-supporting except for a small "seed fund"
provided by central headquarters at the time the chapter was organized
and other funds from time to time necessary to cover emergencies.
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The membership cost was optional and was determined by each
individual chapter.

The treasurer was generally the head of the Finance

Committee and was charged with the responsibility of keeping accurate
financial records.

This included opening a bank account in the name

of the chapter, setting up books which were available for regular audit,
providing a system for approval of bills to be paid, and issuing receipts
for all contributions.
Other activities of each chapter included the "Ten for Romney"
program which theoretically provided for each new member to bring in
ten more new ones, and for each of these ten to bring in ten more.

In

this manner, each local chapter would grow rapidly, and the entire organization would thus mushroom into a large and effective body.

Although

not all new members brought in ten more, many did, and some brought in
many more than ten. The result was plenty of members and lots of
support for all chapter activities,
"The Undecided Voter" program was a novel idea.

When a person

who was contacted stated he was undecided as to how he would vote, his
name was taken and the reasons for his indecision were noted.
name was then forwarded to Romney Volunteer headquarters.

His

Shortly

after this he would receive a personal letter, individually written
and signed by Romney explaining his position in relation to the areas
in which the individual was undecided and asking for his support.
Another activity undertaken by the Romney Volunteers, along
with the Romney for Governor staff, was the distribution of Romney's
personal voter questionnaires which asked the voter to write his
opinions on certain political issues and problems in the state and to
mail these to George Romney,

Days were set aside by each chapter for

this activity, and these questionnaires were distributed door to
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door, on windshields, in parking lots, on street corners, and in various
places of business.
The voter questionnaires, introduced by Romney in June of 1962,
were one of the many "unorthodox" facets of his campaign.

The ques-

tionnaire consisted of a legal sized paper, asking at the top, "Will
you spend 4 minutes--and 4 cents~-to improve the State of Michigan?"
Following this was a short personal message outlining Romney's belief
that the citizens of Michigan are aware of its problems and have valuable opinions that can aid in their solution.

After this message there

followed a list of ten statements which outlined some of Romney's basic
political beliefs and gave the voter a chance to indicate whether he
agreed, disagreed, or was undecided about that particular idea.

These

questions covered the majority of the problems then currently at issue
in Michigan state government, for example, solution of the unemployment problem, special interest domination of government, constitutional
reform, government indebtedness and the tax problem.

At the bottom was

a space for the voter to place his name and address, but he was diplomatically informed that this was not necessary if he did not care to
include it.

On the back was space for additional comments on any area

about which the voter might care to express himself.

The questionnaire

could then be folded and mailed to Romney campaign headquarters in
Detroit.
Although many of the questionnaires were not filled out and
returned, a surprisingly high number were, and these generally demonstrated that the sender had put a considerable amount of thought and
effort into his answers.

Three out of every four questionnaires re-

turned included personal notes from the senders.

Many people

attached checks and offered to work as volunteers in the campaign.
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Very few were critical of Romney himself, although many were critical
of the then current governmental setup in Lansing.

2

As the campaign progressed, the return rate of the questionnaires
increased, and in late September, of an average of 340 pieces of mail
reaching campaign headquarters each day, nearly 200 were voter questionnaires.
Romney's staff made concise and current compilations of questionnaire results and used these extensively in determining policy
pronouncements and in writing campaign literature.

Romney himself

noted carefully the comments on the questionnaires and alluded to them
frequently in his public pronouncements.
Each questionnaire received a personal reply from Romney staff
personnel which answered questions, clarified issues, and expressed
thanks for the opinions expressed.
Romney and his staff personnel explained that the questionnaire
served at least two extremely significant functions.

First, they made

contact with individual voters and let them know of Romney's political
opinions and of his philosophy concerning the importance of individual
voter opinion, and second, they gave Romney and his staff a greater and
more adequate measure of the type and character of voter opinion within
the state.

2

The Detroit News, September 30, 1962, p. 8-B.

3

Ibid., August 5, 1962, p. 22-A.

4

Those with return addresses.

CHAPTER SIX
CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE NEGRO ISSUE
The first Republican gubernatorial candidate in Michigan to
make a concentrated effort to attract the Negro vote was George Romney.
Charles M. Tucker Jr., a Negro, was a Romney staff member who had the
specific assignment of dealing with the civil rights issue,
"Charlee," as he became known to Romney staff members, was
admirably qualified to fill this position.

Only thirty years old at

the time of the campaign, he is a Detroit native, a graduate of Wayne
State University (Business, Advertising, and Marketing) and has been
employed as an account executive with an advertising and public relations firm.

He is a former editor of various weekly Negro newspapers

and was, at the time of the campaign, manager of the Pontiac Michigan
Office of Associate Brokers Investment Company Incorporated (real estate
and mortgages), and is owner of Tucker Modernization Company (a construction firm).

He was president of the Oakland County NAACP for two years

and vice president of the Michigan NAACP chapter for two years.

He has

worked closely with most of the Negro press in Michigan and during the
campaign was city editor of the Detroit Tribune, Detroit's leading Negro
newspaper.
"Charlee" explained his basic goal as that of "making the Negro
voters aware" of Romney.

He stated that in the past the unions and the

Democrats have cultivated the Negro vote in Michigan while the Republicans have not.

The Negro voters in Michigan have traditionally
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identified with the Democratic party which generally has accepted them
as party members but has expended little effort to help them beyond
the minimum necessary to hold their vote.

Tucker estimated the maximum

change of the Negro vote he expected to achieve was about two and one
half per cent to vote for Romney who otherwise would have voted for
Swainson.
His methods included submission of press releases to the Negro
press and to the regular media.

He made sure all media were informed

of all Romney activities in the civil rights area and that all these
activities were properly covered by the press. This included both
seeing that enough was done and also that it was not overdone (for example,
too many Romney pictures with Negroes could have an adverse effect on the
white voters).
Background research was done by Tucker on the Negro organizations to which Romney spoke so that he was thoroughly apprised of the
environment in which he found himself in any contact with Negroes and
their organizations.
Tucker felt his job included the strategic use of "color" under
the proper circumstances.
the Negro with Romney.

He attempted to develop an identification of

This was done in various ways, such as by let-

ting Romney be seen with the right percentage of colored people at the
proper times. A good example of this was use of the Romney girls, blueuniformed girls who were at all major Romney appearances, passing out
literature and adding to the appearance of the gathering.

If the

gathering was to be all white, the girls would be all white; if it was
likely to be mixed, the girls would be mixed in about the right proportions; if it was to be a colored gathering, most of the Romney girls
would be colored.

In addition to the Romney girls, other colored
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Romney staffers were at strategic places and times with Romney when
this was needed. An example of this was provided by Tucker himself
who showed up at the fairgrounds in Detroit on Labor Day.

Asked by

Romney, "What are you doing here, Charlee?", Tucker replied, "I thought
I might be able to add a little ' color. '" He afterwards told the
author, "My only regret was that I wasn't bigger and blacker."
One of Tucker1s activities was to provide organization at the
"grass roots" level among the Negroes. As much as was possible, he set
up Romney campaign organizations among Negro voters.

His biggest

problem here was to keep ineffective, self-appointed, Negro leaders
happy and still to get past them with effective organization to the
common voter.

In the past, Tucker stated, these "figureheads" felt

that their personal glory was paramount and tried to achieve same with
a minimum amount of effort.
Occasionally Tucker would set up outlines for some speeches to
colored groups with which Romney was not familiar.

Romney, however,

generally wrote his own speeches and seldom used a prepared text.
Soliciting opportunities for Romney to speak to selected Negro
groups was included in Tucker's responsibilities. Many groups were
willing to have Romney speak, some out of sincere interest and some
for purposes of ridicule.

Tucker tried to select and schedule only

the ones having the most value to Romney.

As with other areas, schedul-

ing was the top problem.
The author attended a number of these Negro meetings.

Typical

was a Monday evening church meeting in the heart of the Negro section.
As Romney staff members, our party was received courteously and
1

Later in the campaign, as the pace quickened and issued multiplied, Romney relied more on prepared speeches
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politely, albeit apprehensively, by the numerous Negro clergy

Romney

received much the same type of reception, cool, but polite. The
audience mirrored the attitude of the clergyo

Romney's speeches to

this type of audience left something to be desired.2
In summing up, "Charlee" said he felt his job was to "sell his
product, 'Romney,' to the Negro voter" and he employed all means at
his disposal to do so.
Besides Tucker, there were three other Negroes on Romney's
staff.

One, a married woman in her late twenties, was a receptionist,

and the other two were young fellows who worked in various clerk and
assistant capacities.

In addition to these members of the permanent

staff at the Industrial Building in Detroit, there were hundreds of
Negroes working in a voluntary capacity in connection with the various
voluntary organizations, such as the Romney Volunteers.
Surprisingly enough, although the Negro is denied the preisthood in the Latter-day Saint Church* this fact was never used by the
Democrats as a campaign issue. The factors behind this are obscure,
although it can be partially explained by the fact that Governor Swainson is a former member of the Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints. At the outset of the campaign, both Governor Swainson and Mr. Romney issued statements that religion would not be an
issue in the campaign.,
In the earliest stages of the campaign, Romney was asked on
several occasions to explain the Mormon position on the Negro.

He

replied by asking that the voters examine his personal record on civil
2

Romney always seemed to reflect the mood of his audience
and was at his best before positive audiences whose support he could
feel.
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rights and that he personally, and not the Mormon Church, was on
trial.3

He steadfastly refused to discuss this issue at greater length

and as the campaign progressed, questions of this nature were asked
less and less frequently.

When this question was raised in the later

stages of the campaign, Romney or his aides would merely state that
his position was a matter of public record and available to those who
were interested.
Only once was a public charge made against Romney on the Negro
issue.

On this occasion a Negro minister made a public statement in

which he charged that Romney would not be fit to serve in public office
because of the beliefs of his religion pertaining to the Negro people.
His charge was given little publicity, but was picked up by one Democratic candidate for a lesser office and used in a speech.

The

minister was at once soundly criticized by his colleagues, and the
candidate was immediately attacked by members of his own party*
consequence of these criticisms, little more was said.

As a

There were a few

small recurrences of this issue on various occasions throughout the
remainder of the campaign, but they seemed to attract little popular
support.
In the final election Romney was able to show in many predominately Negro areas a considerable gain over previous Republican

3

His personal record as a fighter for civil rights throughout
the years is extremely impressive. He has worked actively for integration of Detroit City Schools and served on numerous committees in
support of civil rights action, including the Citizen's Housing and
Planning Council, The Detroit Victory Council, and the Board of Directors of the United Negro College Fund. Romney actively supported the
Fair Employment Practices Act of 1955 in Michigan, and he played a
significant role in the incorporation of the model civil rights
provisions of the state's new constitution.
The Detroit News, October 19, 1962, p. 11-B.
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candidates in these areas.

It appears that Romney's efforts to swing a

portion of the Negro vote met with at least the degree of success
which was anticipated, and in spite of the obvious handicap of his
religion, Romney was able to make a better showing among Michigan's
Negroes than had any former Republican gubernatorial candidate.

5

Ibid., November 19, 1962, p# 7-B. Ibid., November 7, 1962,
p. 10-B# These results are representative of a few predominately Negro
areas in Detroit, showing Romneyfs gain in 1962 over Nixon1s percentage
in I960. Detroit's 1st ward, Nixon, 22tt8, Romney, 30,2; 9th ward,
Nixon, 16.5, Romney, 22,7; 19th ward, Nixon, 2101, Romney 27„4»
Romney1s statewide gain among all Negroes was probably somewhat less
than these figures would indicate.

CHAPTER SEVEN
ISSUES AND EVENTS
During the course of the campaign, several issues arose and
assumed an importance all out of proportion to their ultimate significance.

Romneyfs bout with the conservative wing of the Republican

party was one such issue.
Since his entrance into active political life, Romney had
always expressed his opinions on political issues with almost disarming
candor.

His expressions concerning the right-wing elements of the

Republican party were no exception to this rule.
When it became known that Richard Durant, vice-chairman of the
Fourteenth District of the Republican party in Wayne County was an
active member of the John Birch Society, Romney staked his political
image on the issue and publicly asked Durant to resign his post.

This

was a direct contradiction of past Republican policy in such cases and
was against the counsel of not a few leading state Republicans.

In the

past, the party had almost universally ignored such situations, feeling
that party unity should be paramount and should be maintained at all
costs.
Upon Durant's refusal to resign, Romney characteristically took
the direct approach.

He arranged a meeting with Durant, which took

place on Thursday, July 26, 1962. Unable to reach an agreement,
another meeting was held the same evening.

As Romney was unable to

attend the evening meeting, he was represented by John Feikens, former
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Federal Judge and Republican State Chairman, and Wilbur Mo Brucker,
former Secretary of the Army.
Friday morning.

This meeting lasted until 1:30 a.m.

Still unable to reach an agreement, Durant finally

announced he would resign if he could choose his successor. As Romney
would not consider his demand, a breakfast meeting of the Republican
party members of Detroit's exclusive Grosse Point was called.1
The lakeside breakfast was held outdoors on the morning of
July 28, in the beautiful surroundings characteristic of the Fourteenth
District, which was known to include many of Michigan's wealthiest and
most influential families.

In Romney's speech to this gathering, he

asked that Durant resign in the interest of party unity, making the point
that many independent and democratic voters would not vote for a candidate representing a party who fellowshipped such groups as the John Birch
Society.

In closing his speech, Romney dramatically placed his own

personal political future on the line by stating, n If delegates from
this district re-elect this man, they will have repudiated me."2
Durant, who stood passively on the sidelines smoking a pipe while
Romney denounced him, spoke briefly after Romney.

He made no direct men-

tion of his requested resignation, but spoke instead of party unity, and he
re-emphasized his support of Romney as the GOP standard bearer in 1962.3
No mention was made of district chairman Stanley A. Baldwin,
but it was known that he was a Durant supporter and would probably
step down if Durant did.

It was common knowledge that Durant, though
4

vice-chairman, was the de facto leader of the District.
1

The Detroit News, July 27, 1962, p. 1.

2

The Detroit Free Press, July 29, 1962, p. 3-A.

3

The Detroit News, July 29, 1962, p. 1.

4

Ibid., July 27, 1962,

p.

The matter

1.
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was solved when Durant ran for re-election, but was defeated in the
District Party convention election on August 15.
The political significance of this action on R o m n e y ' part was
assessed by the editors of The Detroit News, who commented that his
action had

"The ring of leadership" and demonstrated that "he can

match words with action."

The editors concluded that as a result of

this action, Romney had "grown 10 feet tall" as Republican candidate for
governor of Michigan.
Another issue that flared up and assumed gigantic proportions
for a short time, was the reapportionment "crisis" which during the
earlier stages of the campaign threatened to upset the election schedule
and for a time had the prospects of being one of the major issues in the
1962 elections in Michigan.
The "crisis" which erupted in mid-July, less than three weeks
before the August 7 primary elections, had its beginning almost three
years before with a suit filed December 7, 1959, in the State Supreme
Court by August Scholle, AFL-CIO president.

In this suit, Scholle

charged that he was being denied "equal protection of the law" as an
individual residing in Oakland County, one of the state's most densely
populated counties.

The basis of his contention was that his vote in

electing State Senators was not equal in weight to those of voters residing in the more rural areas of the state.
Mr. Scholle was represented throughout this litigation by Ted
Sachs, a Detroit lawyer specializing in labor law.

Sachs was described

in a newspaper article as being "a quiet 43-year old legal genius,"
5

Ibid., July 28, 1962, p. 4-A.

6

The Detroit Free Press, July 18, 1962, pp. 1, 2-A.

7

The Detroit News, July 22, 1962, p. 3-A.
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It was Sachs, searching through relatively obscure Federal court decisions on civil rights and equal protection matters, who first discovered the possibility of pressing a legal suit based on the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution.
In June of 1960, Scholle's suit was heard by the State Supreme Court,
who in a split decision ruled against him.
the case to the United States Supreme Court.

Scholle immediately took
After some consideration

and review, the United States Supreme Court sent the case back to the
State Supreme Court for review.
The State Court did not act on this suit until July 18, 1962,
when it ruled that the current districting system was unconstitutional.
In this ruling, the Court called off the August 7 primary elections for
the State Senate and directed the legislature to draw up thirty-two
districts of equal population.

The Court further directed that if the

legislature did not reapportion the Senate by August 20, its seats would
be filled by an at-large election under the jurisdiction of the Court.
In this case, the Court-directed Primary would then be held September
11.8
The districting system rejected by the court in this action was
adopted in the November 1952 election where the voters rejected an
amendment sponsored by the AFL-CIO and approved an amendment sponsored
by the rural areas of the state.

The amendment sponsored by the

labor unions wanted population to be the sole guide to voting power.
The outstate communities wanted area to be a determining factor also,
and their amendment won.

This amendment increased the number of

districts by two making thirty-four Senators the new permanent number
8

Ibid., July 18, 1962, p. 1.
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authorized by the

constitution.9

Upon this ruling of the court, the legislature began to take
steps to implement the court's directive.

However, they also took

steps to have the ruling appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
In late July, a delegation of four Michigan Republican State Senators
flew to Littleton, New Hampshire to present their appeal to United
States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, who was there on vacation
and was given authority to make an interim decision, as the Supreme
Court was not then in session.10
Justice Stewart granted a delay of the Michigan Supreme Court
ruling.

This ruling temporarily set aside all effects of the state

court directive, restored the August 7 primary, and in effect, allowed
the Senate to be re-elected under the old districting plan.

This

ruling was not a reversal of the Michigan court decision, but as Justice Stewart stated, the "logical course of action" to stop hasty and
ill-defined action before the United States Supreme Court could have
time to make a decision on the merits of the

case.11

The decision was

interpreted throughout the state of Michigan as a temporary victory for
the Republicans.
Immediately after Justice Stewart's decision, the GOP leaders
of the state began a move to have the Senate redistricting issue
placed on the November ballot and passed on by the voters of the state.
For this to be possible, however, the Republicans would have required,
in addition to their own, a minimum of eighteen Democratic votes in

9

The Detroit Free Press, July 19, 1962, p. 4-A.

10

11

The Detroit News, July 26, 1962, p. 4-B.

The Detroit Free Press, July 28, 1962, p. 1. The Detroit News,
July 27, 1962, p. l.
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the House.

They already had enough votes in the Senate. Under the

provisions of the constitution at that time, a two-thirds vote of both
chambers was required to have a provision placed on the ballot. Because of Democratic opposition to this plan, the project was
abandoned and remained a dead issue throughout the rest of the campaign.
The issue was further complicated by the adoption of the new
constitution, which provided a new formula to be used in apportionment
of the legislature.

This new formula was based on population-area

formulas for both the House and Senate. At this writing, the new provisions have not been challenged in a court of law.
A third issue that bobbed its head up periodically during the
campaign was a many-headed monster known as Michigan's tax structure.
For many years, the legislature had patched up the state's taxing
system with hundreds of statuatory amendments and revisions, most of
the expedient, "temporary," wait-for-a-more-opportune-time variety,
nearly all of which became permanent parts of the system.

The entire

structure was grossly unfair because it taxed various segments of the
population to a much greater extent than others, and caused numerous
problems of interpretation and application of the complicated provisions.
The circumstance that finally brought to a head the real inadequacy
of Michigan's tax structure was the fiscal crisis of 1959 in which the
state suffered an unparallel deficit of 95.5 million dollars in the
General Fund during the fiscal year ending June 20.12
To meet this crisis, the legislature made three temporary moves
which provided stop-gap relief.

The first was the liquidation of the

12
Citizens for Michigan, A Program For Michigan Tax Reform,
(Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1961), p. 1.
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Veteran's Trust Fund which produced about 40 million dollars and helped
to reduce the General Fund deficit to 64 million dollars by the end
of the next fiscal year ending June 30, 1960. The second move was the
imposition of certain temporary taxes which produced about 50 million
dollars in revenue and which were allowed to expire June 30, 1961. The
third measure was an increase in the state sales tax from three percent
to four percent effective January 1,

1961.

In spite of these measures,

the state General Fund deficit was back up to 71.7 million dollars by June
30, 1961.13
To try to arrive at a solution for this problem, a sub-committee
of the Taxation Committee of Citizens for Michigan made a detailed
study of Michigan's tax structure.
at were:

Some of the conclusions they arrived

first, that Michigan's tax structure was failing to achieve a

reasonable degree of equity in the distribution of the tax burden throughout the various segments of the state population.

For example, Michi-

gan's business taxes, including the Business Activities Tax,

were

among the highest in the nation and caused Michigan business and
industrial taxes to be far out of proportion with other segments of the
taxpaying community.

Another segment of the community which the com-

mittee felt was being overtaxed was the low income groups.

This was

mostly by means of sales, property, excise, and other "nuisance"
taxes. 15
The second conclusion at which the committee arrived was that
many inequitable and harmful abuses were arising from the right of
13

14

Ibid., pp. 1, 2.

Michigan was the only state in the union to haVe this particu-

lar tax.
15

A Program For Michigan Tax Reform pp. 2,3.
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certain local communities to levy flat-rate income taxes. For example,
persons working in one community and residing in another found themselves paying taxes to support the community in which they worked and
either being exempt in their own community or required to pay a double
tax, one in each community.16
Aside from the direct fiscal problems caused by the tax structure, two other side results were obvious:

(1) new business and industry

were discouraged from settling in Michigan because of the high taxes
and unfamiliar taxing means, and (2) there was a continual series of
debates, legislation and counter-legislation, intercity battles, etc.
over the various and often conflicting tax structures.
The flat-rate income tax issue came to a head during the campaign when Representative John T. Bowman, a Democrat from Macomb County,
introduced a bill into the state House of Representatives which would
have prevented Detroit from levying a one percent income tax on nonresidents working in

Detroit.17

The bill passed the House and the

Senate but was vetoed by Governor Swainson.
This action caused Swainson some unpopularity among the nonDetroiters working in the city. After the election, some Democratic
apologists blamed the "Bowman Bill" for Swainson's

defeat.18

In early

July, the constitutionality of this non-resident tax levied by Detroit
was challenged in Wayne County Circuit
ruled that the tax was

Court.

Judge Neal Fitzgerald

constitutional.19

l6

Ibid.

17

The D e t r o i t News, November 8, 1962,

18

Ibid.

19

The D e t r o i t Free P r e s s , J u l y 3 , 1962, p. 1.

November 18, 1962,
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p.
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Although no further action came either on the Bowman Bill or on
the planned appeal of Judge Fitzgerald's ruling during the campaign,
the tax issue still remained as one of the more important issues,,

In

almost every discussion conducted by either Romney or Swainson, where questions from the public were allowed, the Bowman Bill or the tax issue
would be raised.
Early in the campaign Romney stated his position as being in
favor of "complete spending reform as well as complete tax reform" for
the state*

He further stated that if an income tax were clearly neces-

sary to "provide a more equitable and adequate tax structure" for the
state, he would be in favor of it.

20

With this answer, he managed to

avoid a direct stand on the city income tax issue, which was probably
the best position he could have taken.
Under the new constitution, which was adopted by the voters in
April, 1963, the legislature was given the power to levy a flat-rate
income tax, (but not a graduated income tax), either at the state or
local level.

There had previously been some question as to whether or

not the legislature could levy a graduated income tax.

21

The program recommended by the Taxation Committee of CFM in 1961
included the following measures;

(1) state wide adoption of a flat-

rate personal income tax under which taxable income would be defined
approximately as it is for Federal income tax purposes, (2) a corporation income tax, similarly patterned after the Federal tax, and
employing the same rate as the personal income tax, (3) repeal of the
Business Activities Tax, (4) exemption of tangible personal property

20

The Detroit News, June 16, 1962, p. 7-A.

2l

Michigan Challenge, June 1962, p. 28.
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from local property tax, (5) restoration of the temporary taxes which
expired June 30, 1961, and (6) development of a method for uniform
assessment for real

property.22

The committee felt that a program in-

volving these basic areas would do much to improve Michigan's sagging
tax structure.

No further action, however, was taken on this problem

during the period of the campaign.

22

23

23

A Program For Michigan Tax Reform, pp. 4, 5.

In late 1963, Governor Romney did succeed in getting a
program introduced into the legislature similar to the one outlined by
the Tax Committee of CFM, but it was defeated by the legislature*,

CHAPTER

EIGHT

OPPOSITION STRATEGY

A s a direct result of the f o u r t e e n - y e a r D e m o c r a t i c

dominance

o f M i c h i g a n ' s m a j o r s t a t e e l e c t i v e o f f i c e s , the D e m o c r a t i c n o m i n e e w a s
v i r t u a l l y a s s u r e d of being electedo

T h i s r e s u l t e d in a c o n s i d e r a b l e

amount of i n t r a - p a r t y rivalry and o c c a s i o n a l l y a real b a t t l e

inside

the p a r t y to see who w o u l d get the p a r t y ' s n o m i n a t i o n .
T h i s s i t u a t i o n t o o k a direct a b o u t - f a c e in t h e 1 9 6 2 e l e c t i o n s .
G o v e r n o r S w a i n s o n w a s u n o p p o s e d in the p r i m a r y , as w e r e the m a j o r i t y
o f the D e m o c r a t i c c a n d i d a t e s for m a j o r o f f i c e s a r o u n d the s t a t e .

One

Detroit n e w s p a p e r analyst described the s i t u a t i o n in t h i s m a n n e r .
T h e t h r e a t e n e d loss of l e a s e on t h e g o v e r n o r ' s o f f i c e after
14 y e a r s h a s M i c h i g a n D e m o c r a t s r e a c h i n g for a n t i d o t e s .
O u t b r e a k s of d i s u n i t y are being t r e a t e d with such long p r o v e n
c o u n t e r i r r i t a n t s as " D o n ' t rock the b o a t " and "Don't c h a n g e h o r s e s
in t h e m i d d l e of the stream."
At t i m e s the p r e s c r i p t i o n of p a r t y l e a d e r s b e c o m e s m o r e
p o t e n t , c o n t a i n i n g some of the i n g r e d i e n t s of " P e a c e at any
price."1
From t i m e to time throughout the c a m p a i g n S w a i n s o n and o t h e r
D e m o c r a t i c l e a d e r s i n d i c a t e d to the p r e s s t h e i r c o n c e r n w i t h such
s t a t e m e n t s a s , " T h i s is the hardest fought c a m p a i g n in y e a r s , " w e
a r e " n e c k and n e c k , " and toward t h e end of the c a m p a i g n

Swainson

s t a t e d , " I am c a m p a i g n i n g as hard as I k n o w h o w . "
T h e D e m o c r a t i c c o n c e r n o v e r this s i t u a t i o n w a s r e f l e c t e d

in

t h e i r c o n s i d e r a b l e e m p h a s i s o n the " g e t t i n g out t h e v o t e " a s p e c t s of

1

T h e Detroit N e w s , J u n e 2 4 , 1 9 6 2 , p. 7-B.
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the campaign.

This was particularly evident in the month preceding the

final registration date of October 8. Swainson emphasized this in his
speeches by saying such things as, "If you aren't registered by October
8th, I don't want to talk to you on October 9th."

2

An intensive drive

was also launched to "officially enroll" people into the Democratic
party.

This included rallies, voter registration drives, neighborhood

coffee caucuses, and emphasis on registration in campaign literature.
One pamphlet in particular, done in simple cartoon style, contained an
entry blank and instructions on how to join the Democratic Party.

This

strategy was based on the theory that there are more Democrats in Michigan;
and therefore, if they would all vote, the Democrats should win.
Some of the basic issues emphasized by the Democrats in their
literature and in their campaign pronouncements were:

(1) Swainson's

fight to keep Michigan government on an even keel in the face of the
"obstructionist" Republican-dominated legislature, (2) a personal campaign against Romney in an effort to belittle his past accomplishments
and to demonstrate the "inconsistencies" of his position on various issues, and (3) the "party loyalty" approach, which was used extensively.
Swainson made numerous references to the fact that he was a "Democrat and
proud of it."

He made certain that all his campaign literature labeled

him as a loyal Democrat.

On the other hand, Romney did not identify him-

self as a Republican on any campaign literature, and often stated, "I
am a citizen first and a Republican second."

Many of Swainson's

speeches alluded to the fact that Romney was "ashamed of his party."
This emphasis of party by Swainson and de-emphasis by Romney
was carried on throughout the campaign.

2

Swainson supporters published

Ibid., September 30, 1962, p. 8-B.
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a series of pamphlets entitled, "Governor Swainson's fight for . . ."
jobs, tax justice, civil rights, schools, senior citizens, etc.
Each of these pamphlets had the same basic format, beginning with
"What Governor Swainson has d o n e . . . "

Following this would be a

listing of the efforts of Swainson in the particular area named.
Below this was listed "what the Republican controlled legislature
d i d . . . , " and then was listed the actions the legislature had taken
to "obstruct" Swainson's actions.

The emphasis of these series of pam-

phlets was to point out the problems Governor Swainson had had in getting his programs approved by a legislature dominated by the "Old
Guard" Republicans.

This problem with the legislature was a real one,

as Romney was to find out during his term as governor.

The Democrats

were attempting to place a "guilt by association" label on Romney as
a member of the same party as those causing the problems in Lansing.
One set of pamphlets put out by the Democrats was illustrated
with a caricature of an exceedingly obese elephant representing the GOP
in various poses, such as mashing down the capitol building, squashing
the taxpayer, and otherwise causing havoc with the state.

Another

pamphlet widely distributed was a pictorial history of the life of
John B. Swainson, showing him as a high school football player (captain
of the team), as an Eagle Scout, as a family man, and with President
Kennedy looking . . . "forward, fighting for progress and the welfare
of all the people."

There was also a picture of him in his World

War II soldier uniform, and here it is mentioned that he was severely
wounded in November 1944 while on a night patrol in France.

Little

mention was made during the campaign of the fact that this wound
resulted in the loss of both legs below the knees, although his "personal
courage" was mentioned throughout.
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Much was made of the fact that Romney had once made a $100 contribution to Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA), an extremist
right-wing group,

Romney admitted he had made the contribution and

said he had done it as a "favor to a friend."
he had no connection with the group.

He further stated that

3

It was obvious to even a casual observer that the Democraticcontrolled labor unions formed the "grass roots" organization of the
Democratic campaigns.3 Most rallies, speeches, and other Democratic
political meetings were held in union halls.

Many candidates for lesser

offices on the Democratic ticket set up their headquarters in union
halls.

Union meetings and membership rosters were used to recruit

volunteer workers to help with virtually all Democratic campaigns for
office.
Swainson's campaign headquarters in the Book Building in Detroit
consisted of a two-room suite on the second floor and, as near as could
be observed, was staffed by only two women.

When the author visited

there, he wandered around picking up campaign literature and looked
questioningly at everyone who looked like they might possibly work
there.

He was totally ignored, and after about twenty minutes decided

to leave.

One leading Republican leader said the Book Building head-

quarters was a "front" to give the appearance that there was a campaign
organization other than the labor union organization.

This accusation

may not be entirely justified, but it was obvious that most Democratic
campaign agendas, including Swainson's, were built around facilities
and audiences provided by the various labor unions.
Early in the campaign it was reported that President Kennedy

3
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would come to Michigan, probably in October, to address a $1000 a
plate "brunch" to help the Democratic cause in the state. The idea
was severly criticized by Michigan Republicans and was abruptly vetoed
by the White House.
President Kennedy, however, did play an important part in the
campaign.

The President arrived in Michigan on Friday, October 5,

1962, and made a whirlwind tour, making speeches throughout the state.
The following is representative of the content of Mr. Kennedy's
speeches and indicates the nature of his tour:
This is not a nonpolitical trip. It is a political trip in
the sense that we have come here to Michigan in order to talk to
the Democrats of this state who on many occasions, both in this
state and in the country, have stood up for progress.
And that is why we are back in Michigan tonight, to join you
in a campaign to re-elect a distinguished governor who has been
carrying the banner in this state formerly borne by the present
assistant secretary of state for Africa, Soapy Williams.5
The President's visit, which was timed to be just before the registration
deadline of October 8, was, according to party spokesmen, basically an
attempt to "get out the Party vote."

After Mr. Kennedy returned to

Washington, White House sources reported that the President's swing
through Michigan had convinced him that Romney had an excellent chance
of winning the election.
In addition to President Kennedy, national Democratic figures,
described by Romney as a "federally organized rescue squad," traveled
to Michigan during the latter part of the
4
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group were Vice President Johnson, former President Truman, Secretary
of Commerce Luther Hodges, former Governor G. Mennen Williams, three
other cabinet members, two U . S . Senators, and Democratic National
Chairman John M.

Bailey.9

These visits marked a change of emphasis

in the Democratic approach to the campaign.

During the earlier stages

of the campaign, the Democratic pronouncements centered around criticism of Republicans and the minimizing of Romney's accomplishments.
After these visits, the emphasis seemed to shift to a positive identification with the national Democratic party, which was then enjoying a
healthy national image.
Romneyfs staff, when asked if they were going to counter by
bringing in national figures on the Republican scene, stated that this
approach demonstrated the concern the Democrats had about victory and
said that to call in national figures would demonstrate a "lack of confidence."

Concerning this, Romney made the statement, "We'd better get

leadership in this state that doesn't need to rely on a dozen coattails
in order to get re-elected."10

Many newspaper editorials pooh-poohed

this "coattail" approach along with the fact that Swainson, in the
later stages of the campaign, began to adopt many of the federal benefits of the Democratic administration as pertinent Michigan campaign

issues.11
Although the Cuban crisis prevented President Kennedy from
making a scheduled return visit to Michigan, the Democrats seized
upon this as an opportunity to emphasize their "don't change parties

9lbid.
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in the middle of a crisis" approach, and numerous photographs were
circulated throughout the later stages of the campaign showing Swainson and other Democratic candidates with the President.

These photo-

graphs were accompanied by literature emphasizing the need for state
unity with the national party in power, especially during a time of
crisis.

It did appear to most political observers that the Democrats

felt they were running slow and were attempting to borrow some mileage
from the Democratic party's national image.

CHAPTER NINE

THE TURNING POINT

When Romney decided to run for the governorship of Michigan,
he realized the odds were against him.

One of the big obstacles he

knew he would have to overcome was the traditional Democratic orientation of most labor union members.

He realized he could not be elected

without convincing a substantial number of these union members to cross
party lines and to vote for him.
Symbolic of labor opposition to Romney's candidacy, was August
(Gus) Scholle, President of Michigan's 650,000 member AFL-CIO, who
played a significant role in the campaign.

An extremely outspoken

individual, he made his opinion heard on almost every significant issue
throughout the campaign.
Scholle, 58, has served as a labor leader in Michigan since
1937 when he was appointed regional director for the CIO by John L.
Lewis.

He was elected president of the Michigan CIO council in 1940 and

upon the 1958 merger he became president of the AFL-CIO in Michigan.
Most Michigan political analysts hold Scholle to be largely responsible
for the "grass roots" political organization of the Democratic party in
Michigan, which is for all practical purposes one and the same with
the labor union organization.
When the news leaked out that Romney had fasted for a 24-hour

1

The Detroit Free Press, June 10, 1962, p. l.

82

83
period and prayed before making his final decision to run, Gus's
comment was that Romney was a pious faker who was trying to give the
impression that he had a "pipeline to God."2

For this comment, Scholle

was soundly denounced by church groups throughout Michigan and was
even criticized by UAW and other labor union officials.
The author spent an hour in a personal interview with Scholle
which was highlighted by many four letter words of common street
vernacular.

During our discussion, Scholle made many statements con-

cerning his political feelings and ideas, such as "George Romney is a
compulsive liar who lies when the truth would serve him better," and,
"George Romney is a glory-hog who is running for political office just
to satisfy his own e g o "

Our discussion ran the gamut of political

issues in Michigan, and Scholle was always informed as to the elements
involved in each issue, and had very definite opinions concerning each.
It was difficult, however, to escape the feeling that he had allowed
his own political prejudices to cloud considerably his perspective in
objectively analyzing the issues.

One person close to him expressed it

this way: "If Gus could keep his mouth shut a little more, he would
do us all a lot more good."
"Gus," as he is generally called, is known for his "low boiling
point" and his ability to toss insults at whoever opposes him. As an
example of this, in a political debate on reapportionment, which was
broadcast over television between Romney and Scholle, the latter became
so livid with rage that at one point Romney who still remained unruffled,
sagely advised, "Calm down, Gus."

This so delighted spectators and

reporters that it was given national
2
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Typical of charges made by Scholle throughout the campaign was
his charge made in early June, that Republican executives at Chrysler
Corporation had "forced" each employee to contribute two dollars per
thousand dollars of their salary to the Republican party fund.

This

was denied by Lynn Townsend, Chrysler president, and later in the campaign it was brought out that many Democratic contributions were solicited
in just this manner.
Throughout the campaign, Scholle's pronouncements were always
available.

It almost seemed that when political reporters were a little

low on news, they would run to Gus with a quote from Romney or some
other Republican, just to get one of his almost-famous remarks on the
subject.

Concerning this, one reporter had this to say, "The only trouble

with quoting Gus is that you can only print about a tenth of what he
says."

As the campaign progressed, Scholle's remarks seemed to lose

their novelty, and even members of his own party paid less and less attention to him.

Later on in the campaign he received extensive publicity

only when he was called down by another labor leader or a fellow Democrat,
Walter Reuther, president of the powerful United Auto Workers
of Michigan, was another figure of prominence in the campaign.

Not

as colorful as Scholle, he confined his public pronouncements to a minimum and generally made well-thought out statements of his and his unions'
position.
Reuther had worked closely with Romney when Romney was president of American Motors, and both had expressed feelings of mutual
respect and confidence in the abilities of the other on many occasions
preceding the campaign.
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of his profit-sharing program at American Motors, Reuther had stated
that it was the most significant and historic collective-bargaining
agreement ever signed in the United States."
During the campaign, however, Reuther did use the occasion of
political speeches and reporter interviews to criticize Romney and the
Republicans.

Typical of Reuther's criticisms was the following, taken

from one of his speeches: [if Romney is elected he will become the]
"prisoner of a bunch of 18th century politicians," referring to the then
current Michigan legislature.

On this same theme, Reuther predicted

that "GOP reactionary diehards will make hamburger out of Romney's
white horse before he gets the saddle off."

Indirectly referring to

his former praise of Romney's inauguration of collective bargaining at
American Motors, Reuther stated that Romney was a "naive politician"
and would have done better to stick to collective bargaining as president of AMC.7
The UAW president also praised the Democratic administration in
many speeches and continued to refer to those "obstructionist Republicans who, like Senator Barry Goldwater, want to repeal the 20th Century."
It is interesting to note the form Reuther's criticism took during the
campaign, as he seldom, if ever, criticized Romney as an individual,
but only criticized his going into politics and his identification with
the Republican party.
In addition to these leaders, the unions themselves were
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deeply involved in Michigan politics.

The powerful Committee on

Political Education of the AFL-CIO (COPE) had actively supported political "education" in behalf of Democratic candidates for many years.
COPE was in the 1962 campaign in a big way.

Every union member was

contacted in behalf of Democratic candidates through the very efficient
and well-defined organization COPE had built up in Michigan through
the years.

Republican candidates for public office had come to accept

this situation as a political fact of life and had usually considered
organized labor as politically unfertile ground in which to sow their
campaign efforts.
George Romney, characteristically not willing to accept tradition as binding on him, set out to invade the active stronghold of
labor and to stimulate a political awakening among the unions.

He

began by making illusions in his speeches to labor dominance of the
Democratic party along with industry's domination of the Republican
party--both of which he denounced as unhealthy•

These remarks led to

the Democratic-labor charge that Romney had referred to them as a
9
"disease."
In order to meet the labor union members, feel their political
pulse, and try to enlist their support, Romney made numerous visits to
industrial plant gates, many at 5 to 6 a.m. in the morning, to shake
hands with union members as they were changing shifts.

He made

speeches at lunch breaks in plants, took tours of many industrial complexes, talked with the workers as they worked, debated with those who
wanted to debate with him, and in short, took every opportunity he could
to get his message to the union members.

9
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When it was announced that the Labor Day celebration to be held
at the State Fairgrounds in Detroit would include speeches from most
of the major Democratic candidates for state offices, including Governor Swainson, Romney immediately asked for equal time.

He was informed

by union officials that this was a private affair and that the schedule
of events had already been made up and no time would be available for
him to speak.

Romney exploited this refusal to good advantage in his

public statements.

This caused the unions and the Democrats to suffer

a considerable amount of unfavorable publicity.,
Romney showed up at the Labor Day celebration, along with members
of his staff and some Romney Girls.

He listened politely to the speeches,

talked with those who wanted to talk with him, both Democrats and
Republicans, and generally let his presence be known.

As newsmen and

others became aware that Romney was in attendance, he gathered a considerable group of people following in his wake as he moved from place
to place during the day.

The publicity he received from this was of

inestimable value and marked the turning point in Romney's efforts to
crack the union barrier.
Shortly after this Labor Day experience, some of the braver
Labor Union officials, such as those of Detroit's Carpenter's Local
Union 983 and UAW Local 155, took positive action to give Romney a
chance to be heard.

Both of these Unions sent formal invitations to

Romney headquarters asking him to address their Local meetings. "
Once the barrier had been breached, the invitations began to pour in.
"The political curtain is beginning to crack" was Romney's description of the situation.

From this point in the campaign until the

Ibid., October 10, 1962, p. 1.
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election, many unions continued to bid for a place in the crowded campaign schedule.
Romney's appeal to tne union members was centered around his
basic theme of "government by the citizens," not domination by powerful
special interest groups.

He urged the union members to look at all the

issues and not to be influenced by "pressures" from either direction.
He promised, after the election, to look into the necessity of passing
laws to assure Negroes and other minority groups an equal opportunity
for apprenticeship training from labor unions. 11 He attacked union
leaders as being "afraid to let their membership even look at any candidate except the one they

favor."12

Some of the invitations ended up being attempts to force Romney
to debate with the "enemy" on its own grounds and in its own territory.
On several occasions he was met at union halls by sound trucks playing
Democratic or union songs and broadcasting Democratic campaign slogans.
There were usually Swainson supporters there, passing out literature.
Invariably Romney had to deal with hecklers at these meetings.

For

example, as he arrived at one Local, he was immediately surrounded by
hecklers shouting questions at him.

As a rule, Romney was able to trade

shout for shout with anyone, as in this instance when he replied to their
questions by saying, "You really don't want to hear my answers, you just
want to ridicule me," and later, "You know all the questions; you're good
parrots--you're perfect stooges."

The newspapers delighted in reporting

these "noisy exchanges" and "shouting

contests."13

They gave maximum

coverage to such incidents as the following when a man refused to
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shake hands with Romney.

Upon the refusal Romney asked, "You mean your

partisanship is so serious that we can't be friendly and shake hands?"
"That's right," the man said. "You lie too much."
repliedc

"Now look," Romney

"I have done more to stimulate jobs in Michigan during the

last two years than any other man.
a bitter attitude."

You have a closed mind. You have

"That's right," the man said and walked away.14

A number of union officials who supported Romney found themselves
in awkward and even untenable positions.

Warren Creekmore, president

of the 500-plus member UAW Local 280 at Continental Motors Corporation,
became incensed by the distribution of handbills placing him strongly
in favor of Swainson.

He said the handbills were supplied by the Inter-

national Union and distributed by the Local COPE organization without
his authorization. One pamphlet, above the printed signatures of
Local officers including Creekmore, stated that all members of the
Local were Democrats and supported

Swainson.

Another pamphlet, charging

that Romney would support legislation to stop unemployment compensation for employees idled by a strike in a supplier plant, was put out
in Creekmore's name.
"I don't believe that UAW International officers have any right
to tell a member how to vote," said Creekmore.

"People should have a

right to think and vote for themselves."
Although "still a Democrat," Creekmore announced that he was
an active worker in the Romney Volunteers.

A few weeks later he

announced that he was resigning his post as Union president because
"I was forced to choose between the political dictates of the
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International Union and the dictates of my own conscience."

He fur-

ther stated that his position as Union president would force him to
sign checks authorizing funds for COPE workers to engage in activities
not in sympathy with his own political views.

His action prompted

some 300 post cards and letters and numerous phone calls in support of
his position.
After Creekmore's action, it became a little more respectable
for Democrats to come out in support of Romney.

The Romney Volunteers

reported that hundreds of labor union members were working actively
in its various chapters, and the author was able to interview a large
number of union members who were working actively for Romney's election,
or who at least had decided to vote for him.

During the later stages

of the campaign, it was not at all unusual for a large number of people
to come up to Romney each day to tell him that they had never voted for
a Republican in their lives, but now they were going to vote for him.
It would seem Romney's assault on the labor stronghold had been a
success.

The turning point had been reached.

now on.
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It was downhill from

CHAPTER TEN
DEBATES AND POLLS
Four face-to-face clashes, three before television cameras,
formed an important part of the Romney-Swainson campaign.

It is esti-

mated that approximately two to three million persons saw one or more
of the debates in person, watched them on television, or heard them
on the radio.
The first debate was held before the Economic Club of Detroit
in Detroit's famed Cobo Hall on Monday evening, October 8, 1962. This
debate was not televised and lasted for one hour.

It was heard live by

2,300 persons and broadcast over Detroit radio stations WWJ and WJR,
and the opening statements were printed in The Detroit News and The
Detroit Free Press.
The second debate occurred the following evening, October 9, and
originated at WWJ-TV, Channel 4, in Detroit.

This debate, as did the

rest of the television debates, lasted only one-half hour and was carried in Detroit on both Channel 2, WJBK-TV, and Channel 7, WXYZ-TV, from
7:00 to 7:30 p.m.

Outstate TV stations that carried the debates include

WJIM (Lansing), WMSB (Lansing-Jackson), WOOD (Grand Rapids), WNEM (Bay
City), WTOM (Cheboygan), and WPBM (Traverse City),
The third debate occurred on Wednesday, October 17, at 7 p.m.
and originated from WXYZ-TV in Detroit.
1

The fourth debate occurred on
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Friday, October 26, and originated from WJBK, the third Detroit
television station.
Ground rules for the television debates called for a fourminute opening statement by each candidate, a fourteen minute question
and answer period conducted by the television station's news director,
3
and two minutes each for summary or rebuttal.
The first debate at the "Wives' Night" of the Detroit Economic
Club was the first head-on clash of the campaign.

In this encounter,

each opponent was allowed a fifteen minute opening speech followed by
five minutes of rebuttal time; after which, time was allowed for questions
from the floor.

Following the question period, each candidate was then

given two minutes to summarize his position.
Swainson, recognizing that his audience was pro-Romney and probusiness, aimed more to those who were listening in on radio or who would
read his comments in the newspapers.

He began his remarks in this first

debate by citing his record and the campaign promises he had kept in spite
of the opposition of "big business" and its Republican lobbyists.

He

credited "my Democratic administration" with the accomplishments he cited
and blamed a "Republican wrecking crew" in the legislature and among the
lobbies for the failures he mentioned.
Romney countered with the charge that the legislature had opposed
Swainson's programs because they would have led to greater dangers,
such as more unemployment, and said voters "should not be fooled" by
Swainson's claims of progress, as most of them, such as a recent drop in
2
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unemployment, could be traced to the "compact car revolution," and other
successes traceable to business and not to the policies of the Democratic administration in Lansing.

He then spoke of the need for less

"partisanship" and more "citizenship action" as the basis for a solution of Michigan's

problems.5

It was obvious that Romney was the favorite from the start.

His

speech was interrupted by applause six times while Swainson received
only polite applause at the end of his speech and received adverse comments and some catcalls during the speech.

Although neither candidate

claimed victory, spokesmen for both sides stated they thought the debate
had gone favorably.

Some, however, felt that both had been too polite

and had really clashed on but few specific issues.
The second debate the following evening (the first over television) consisted of the same basic issues condensed into the space of
a half hour.

Both candidates seemed tense and nervous, especially before,

but also occasionally during the debate; both became more heated than
they had the evening before and both held press conferences following
the debate in an attempt to strengthen their position.

Viewers inter-

viewed expressed varied reactions, but most indicated they still supported the candidate they had formerly supported, although some few
indicated they had switched sides.
The third encounter was marked by a more relaxed,
and presentation by both candidates.

5

6

easy manner

Each was more confident of his
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position, his facts, and his ability to present himself to the television

audience.

In this debate, Romney charged that one of the state's

most crying needs was the replacement of "one-sided, special interest,
Gus Scholle government with independent public officials" 7
Swainson denied this charge, stating that the Democrats "enjoy
labor support" but do not have "labor control."

He went on to cite

his record and quote statistics to support his statements,
Romney cited the condition of the state when Swainson took office
two years before by alluding to the unemployment problem, "the money
mess," rising taxes, and bitter partisanship.

He went on to say these

problems had not been solved, but had, in fact, increased in their scope.
Swainson countered this by saying his opponent had no platform, no program,
and his political record had been a "flop."8
The fourth and last of the debates, only ten days before election day, was influenced tremendously by the Cuban crisis.

Swainson

took the position that the voters should stick with him and the "Democratic team of experience that backs President Kennedy 100 per cent" on
foreign and domestic programs.

Romney countered this by saying, "We

must strengthen Michigan so Michigan can strengthen the nation," He then
added that the state "has a growing internal crisis produced by politi-

cal

bickering."9
In t h e f i r s t minute of h i s two minute c l o s i n g s t a t e m e n t , Swain-

son r e f e r r e d t o P r e s i d e n t Kennedy by name seven t i m e s , r e i t e r a t i n g t h e
theme he had adopted for t h e n i g h t , which was c a l l e d by r e p o r t e r s , a
7
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"don't change government in the middle of a crisis" approach. Romney
countered with his "time for a change" theme. The other issues of
their final debate were similar to those of the other

debate.

In addition to the four face-to-face encounters between Swainson and Romney, another event of similar nature took place which
achieved considerable publicity and possibly had a significant effect
on the campaign.
It all started when UAW radio-television commentator Guy Nunn
interviewed Governor Swainson on his union-sponsored television show,
"Telescope," over CKLW-TV in Windsor, Ontario, Canada (just across the
Detroit river from Detroit).

Romney asked for equal time and offered

to pay the cost of the air time,

Romney stipulated he would be avail-

able to tape the show at 10 a.m. Saturday morning in keeping with his
policy of not campaigning on Sunday.
Nunn agreed to Romney's conditions and said he was "delighted
to accept"10 Romney's

request.

The show was scheduled for presentation

on Sunday, September 23, at 8 p.m.
Two days after Nunn's acceptance of his offer, Romney wrote him
a letter and again offered to pay for the air time stating that he felt
it was "neither moral nor right" that UAW workers should be "arbitrarily taxed" to pay the cost of "broadcasting political opinions"
which may not necessarily reflect their own thinking.

In this letter,

Romney enclosed a check for the cost of the air time of the broadcast.
What was to be done with the money after Nunn received it, however,
was Nunn's "business" and his

"responsibility."11
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the check back to Romney who sent it to Walter Reuther, president of
the UAW, who forwarded it to the American Heritage Foundation.
This action cleared the way for the actual "interview," which
took place as scheduled.

This "interview" took on all the appearances

of a free-for-all which newsmen described as "the best fight of the
campaign."

The discussion started out hot, but soon got hotter.

Both

men constantly interrupted each other, sometimes pointing fingers, sometimes shouting. Romney's original purpose had been to correct a list
of nineteen "distortions" which he said had been presented by Nunn and
Swainson in the preceding program.

He was only able to present a few

of these, no one is sure just how many.
After the program, Romney burst into the foyer and angrily told
newsmen he resented the "technique" of being "asked so many questions
with so many distortions that you are not expected to clear them up."
13
Romney then smiled at the crowd, waved good-by to them, and left.
Reaction to the program was varied.

Editorial and reader com-

ment in the newspapers seemed to indicate Romney had at least come out
even, if not ahead.14
It is difficult to assess the effect of these "debates" on the
election.

From the beginning, Romney staff personnel were apprehensive

over Romney's television "personality" and attempted to hold his television appearances to a minimum.

Romney, however, projected a much

more positive image than was expected.

On the other hand, many felt

Swainson1s warmth and personality, which live audiences could feel, did
12
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not come through too well on TV.

The debates served at least the

minimal function of acquainting more people with the candidates and
their personalities.

It is the author's assessment of the situation that

Romney's television appearances had a significant positive effect in the
ultimate success of the campaign.
Only one scientific election poll on the 1962 Michigan gubernatorial race was conducted.

This was The Detroit News poll, which was

prepared and conducted by Market Opinion Research Company.

The analysis

articles accompanying each poll were written by the President of Market
Opinion Research, Richard W. Oudersluys.

For the fourteen years pre-

ceding the 1962 elections, this poll had never failed to name the winners in a Michigan final election.
During the course of the campaign, four polls were conducted
by this group.

The research for the polls was done statewide, and the

results were compiled from twenty-seven categories into which the people
interviewed were divided.

These categories included place of residence,

sex, marital status, ethnic group represented, income group, age group,
and occupational group.
The first poll, the results of which were published on September 5, showed that if the election were held at that time, Romney would
receive 50.0 per cent of the vote and Swainson would receive 48„8 per
cent.

The rest of the percentage either went to James Sim, the

Socialist-Labor candidate, or was undecided.
The second poll, results of which were published September 30,
15
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showed that Romney had dropped to 49.7 per cent and Swainson had risen
to 49.5 per cent.

This was the closest of the four polls, and was

Romney's lowest percentage and Swainson's highest.

Romney's

heaviest loss during this period was a 9.3 per cent drop among Wayne
Countyfs skilled labor group.
per cent among this group.

During the same period, Swainson gained 8.4

In this poll, Romney gained some percentage

points outstate and some among foreign-born voters.18
In the third poll, published October 21, Romney was up to 52
per cent of the vote while Swainson had slipped to 47.3 per cento

In

this poll, Romneyfs most significant gains came among skilled labor and
the 21-29 year age group*

This poll was conducted after the first

Swainson-Romney television debate and after the Romney-Guy Nunn "interview."

Other significant gains reflected in this poll included 3.6

per cent gain in the Negro vote and a smaller gain among foreign-born
groups.

This poll contained the highest margin of leadership Romney

held in the four polls taken.

19

In the fourth and final poll, the results of which were published November 4, 1962, just two days before the election, Romney had
slipped to 50.9 per cent and Swainson was up to 48.4 per cent.

This

poll reflected a significant gain for Romney in outstate urban areas,
while he lost most of his former percentage gains among skilled workers.
At this report, however, he had picked up some additional strength in
rural areas.20

This figure proved to be the most accurate in pre-

dicting the final outcome as Romney's 80,000 vote margin proved to be

18

Ibid.

19

Ibid., October 21, 1962, p. 1.

20

Ibid., November 4, 1962, p. 1.
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just less than 3 per cent of the total vote.

In the other statewide

contests, the poll picked only three out of five correctly.
Republicans picked to win were not elected.

The two

21

It is difficult to determine whether or not the polls had any
real significance in the campaign.

For instance, both candidates,

upon being confronted with the poll results, merely stated that the
polls indicated what they had known all along, that it was going to be
a close race and that they should work harder.

It was felt, however,

by many that the polls1 advantage and significance lay in pointing out
weak areas to which more effort should be directed.

22

Both candidates

undoubtedly gained some valuable information from the polls that helped
them to pinpoint areas where more effort was needed.

2l

Ibid.

22 Ibid,, October 22, 1962, p. 12-A.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

AFTER THE ELECTION

At 4:05 a.m. , November 7, 1962, Governor John B. Swainson sent
George Romney a telegram conceding defeat.

The final vote figures

showed that Romney received 1,419,046 votes while Swainson received
1,340,549.

This was a slim victory margin for Romney of 78,497 votes

or just under three per cent of the total votes cast.2
Romney's election marked the end of the fourteen-year Democratic
reign in the state capitol by two Democratic governors, G. Mennen
(Soapy) Williams, who served six terms, and John B. Swainson, who
served one term.
The victory was a personal one for Romney, and not for his
party, as no other Republican candidate for state administrative office
was elected.

This was evidence of the success of his determination to

wage his campaign as an individual and a citizen, and not as a Republi3
can.

The election gave Romney a completely Democratic "Cabinet."
Governor Swainson picked up most of his strength in Detroit

where the AFL-CIO organization was concentrated and where his Negro
support went virtually unchallenged.

Detroit gave Swainson 412,042

1

The Detroit News, November 7, 1962, pp. 1, 10-B.

2

Ibid., p. l.

3

Ibid.
The "Cabinet" so called, was the seven administrative
officers who serve with the governor; Lieutenant Governor, Secretary
of State, State Treasurer, Auditor General, Attorney General, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Highway Commissioner.

100

101
votes and Romney
for Swainson.

205,170.

This was roughly a 67 per cent plurality

In Detroit's suburbs, however, Swainson's vote was far

less than expected.

He dropped considerably from his 1960 figures in

both Wayne and Macomb Counties and he lost Monroe County,

This poor

showing in the suburbs was blamed by many analysts on Swainson's veto
of the Bowman Bill which would have prevented suburban residents working
in Detroit from paying a city income tax.
Swainson also lost the Upper Peninsula which had been one of
former Governor Williams' strongholds. Swainson's loss here was blamed
on his support of the redisricting court order, his snubbing of the
Upper Peninsula State Fair, and general neglect of his political fences
in that area.
Much of Romney's slim margin probably came from his campaign
to win the labor vote,

Romney was the first Republican candidate since

big labor organized Michigan to attract any amount of labor support.
Many labor leaders and some labor organizations, as well as a substantial number of rank-and-file union members broke away from the Democratic party and voted for Romney.

In Detroit's suburbs, Romney won

almost as many labor votes as Swainson, and penetrated significantly
into the traditional Democratic margins in Detroit and Wayne County,
The newspapers delighted in reporting the fact that UAW president
Walter Reuther, and AFL-CIO president, Gus Scholle, were "silent" about
the results of the

election.5

However, a meeting of the AFL-CIO's

Committee On Political Education (COPE) was immediately scheduled to
meet on November 27 at Lansing to study the dilemma to be

4

Ibid.

5

I b i d . , November 7 , 1 9 6 2 ,

p.

8-A.
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labor with Romney as governor.6
Romney also made significant inroads into the Negro vote although
a majority of the Negroes still voted as they traditionally have for
the

Democrats.

Selected returns from thirteen key Detroit Negro areas

indicated that Romney obtained between 22 and 25 per cent of the Negro
vote in upper middle income Negro residential

areas.

Swainson still

carried the middle and lower income Negro districts.7
It seems evident that Romney's original analysis of the situation
was correct, that he could win if he could make significant penetrations into the labor and Negro votes.

There is also some evidence,

but no possibility of obtaining conclusive figures, to indicate that
many ethnic and special interest groups, who traditionally vote Democratic, switched in some measure and voted for RomneyFollowing a brief vacation in California and the West, Romney
settled down to the business of preparing for his inauguration as
Governor on January 1, 1963.

His first action was to appoint several

of his close campaign aides to interim positions to work with Democratic officials to assure an orderly transition of government.

In

this effort he received full co-operation from Governor Swainson.
Romney immediately called a meeting of his Democratic Administrative Board to help map plans for their

administration.

Romney

and his staff were given office space near the Capitol and from there
Romney began to hold meetings with leaders in all areas throughout
the state.

He began at once the all important study of the budget

which was to be submitted within ten days of his inauguration.

6

Ibid.

7

Ibid., p. 10-B.
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new Governor also had approximately eighty to one hundred jobs to fill
in the early stages of his term.

In this he continued his non-partisan

approach and pledged that he would choose the best man for the job
regardless of the person's political affiliation.

He set up what he

called a "3-C" policy on appointments--"competenee, character, and
capacity."

This policy was discouraging to many old line Republicans

but reassuring to

Democrats.8

Romney met the challenge of an all-Democratic Administrative
Board head-on.

He invited the Democrats to his Inaugural Ball celebra-

tion to be held New Year's Eve.
invitation and held their own

The Democrats, however, rejected this

celebration.10

In his personal affairs, Romney immediately resigned as vice
chairman of the board of directors of American Motors Corporation, which
was a position which had been created for him when he decided to run for
governor.11

He also placed his 104,000 shares of AMC stock

12

in the

hands of a bank trustee who, he stated, "will manage and administer"
his stock interests to "permit no diversion of my attention from the
office to which I have been

elected."13

His only other business posi-

tion was a directorship of Douglas Aircraft Corporation, which he also
resigned.
Another of Romney's actions was to resign as President of the
Detroit Stake of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
8

Ibid., December 5, 1962, p. 14-B.

Ibid., December 3, 1962, p. l.

9

In the past the Democratic and Republican state officials have
always held separate celebrations.
10

11

The Grand Rapids Press, November 19, 1962, p. 31.

The

Detroit News, November 15, 1962, p. 1.

12

Ibid., p. 2-A. It was estimated his stock was worth about
$1,800,000 at then current market prices.
13The Grand Rapids Press, November 15, 1962, p. 36.
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Other positions about which he did not take immediate action included
his position on the business advisory board of Wayne State University
and his national directorship of the Round Table of Catholics, Jews,
and Protestants.14
His opponent, Governor Swainson, still remained as the leader
of the Democratic party in Michigan,

At first Swainson said he had

"no plans" as to his future, but later he announced that he would return
to private law practice in

Detroit.15

Although a detailed analysis of Romney's first year as Governor
is beyond the scope of this study, it is worth our while to make a few
pertinent

observations.

The period since Romney's inauguration has

seen the adoption by the people of a new constitution with model provisions in many areas.

The legislative session in 1963 was the most

productive in many years. The budget was balanced, new provisions were
passed to strengthen economic expansion, more effective mental health
programs were passed, measures were taken to assure Detroit being
nominated as a possible site for the 1964 Olympics, and a new progressive
construction safety bill was passed,

Michigan ended the fiscal year

1963 with a budget surplus of more than $40 million.

There has been

noticeable improvement in labor-management relations, evidencing enlightened self-interest on the part of both industry and workers.

In

many ways Michigan is now becoming known as a problem solving state
instead of a "problem"

state.16

In spite of the healthy financial status of the state, Governor

14

The Detroit News, November 15, 1962, p. 2-A.

15

Ibid., December 2, 1962, p. 9-D.

l6

The Deseret News, July 12, 1963, p. 18-A
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Romney determined to overhaul the badly lopsided tax structure of
Michigan.

To accomplish this he prepared a top-to-bottom tax revision

program which included a personal income tax and removed much of the
unfair tax burden from the lower income groups. This program was
designed to shift a larger percentage of the tax burden to the middle
and upper income classes, pillars of the Republican party,,

The total

program was not designed to increase revenue, but merely to distribute
the burden more equitably.

The opposition to this proposal which

Romney received from industry and from the Republican-dominated legislature was natural and expected.

During the 1963 legislative session,

Romney did not succeed in getting this program enacted into law.
almost certain he will try again.

17

Ibid., September 23, 1963, p. 2-A.

It is
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ABSTRACT
Politics in Michigan had been on a low plane for a number of
years.

The troubles were many and their roots could be found deep

in the structure of the state's government.
In April of 1959, the sagging governmental structure gave way
to the extent that the state was unable to meet its payroll.

The

result was the much publicized "Payless Pay Day" which attracted
national and international interest.
Seeing that their elected officials were seemingly powerless
to correct even the basic flaws in Michigan's government, many of the
state's leading business and industrial leaders decided to apply their
considerable talents to improving their state government.

George

Romney, then president of American Motors, was one of these citizens.
The efforts of these men culminated in the formation of a citi
zen's action group known as Citizen's for Michigan, which immediately
divided itself into committees to study all important phases of
Michigan's political structure.

George Romney, as chairman of CFM,

played a leading role in these activities.
CFM's first major effort was its co-operation with other civic
groups throughout the state in getting the constitution amended to
allow the calling of a Constitutional Convention to revise and update
that document.
Romney ran for and was elected a delegate to this convention
which began its work in October of 1961. When the 144 delegates

1

2
completed their deliberations in May of 1962, they had developed an
entirely new document capable of meeting the needs of a growing, everexpanding economic and political complex.

This constitution was sub-

sequently adopted by the voters of Michigan in an election held in
April of 1963.
His political appetite whetted by the Constitutional Convention,
George Romney sensed that his experience and background had almost
inadvertently prepared him to be an ideal candidate for the governorship of Michigan.

After a thorough investigation, coupled with prayerful

consideration, Romney announced he would be a candidate.
His opponent was the incumbent, John B. Swainson, who had all
the resources of the Democratic-labor coalition at his command.

This

coalition had successfully kept a Democrat in Lansing for fourteen
years.
The heart of the campaign is the story of how George Romney,
the "nice guy turned politician" individually attacked and made significant inroads into all areas of Democratic voter strength.

Without doubt

the most significant of these areas was organized labor itself, which
Romney attacked head-on and persistently hammered at the bunkers of
opposition until he was able to make, first one slight penetration,
then another, then a more significant one, until he had whole unions,
along with their leaders, or sometimes in spite of their leaders,
working for his election.
Romney's victory was a personal one, but also, and perhaps more
important, it was a victory for morality and honesty in politics.
George Romney has taken the current adage, "nice guys finish last"
and made it "nice guys finish first."

